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INTRODUCTION
This Article begins to rethink current conceptions of two of the most
significant legal movements in this country1—Legal Realism and Feminist
* Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. I am grateful to the many
individuals who have encouraged and supported this project, including Barbara Babcock,
Ben Barton, Vanessa Burton, Maggi Carfield, Susan Carle, Jennifer Hendricks, Katherine
Kruse, Leticia Saucedo, Brian Tamanaha, Louise Trubek, and Ian Weinstein. Thanks also
to workshop attendees at the Washington University and Suffolk Schools of Law and coparticipants from the Law and Society, Southeastern Association of Law Schools, New
York Law Clinical Theory, Berkshire’s History of Women, and American Association of
Law Schools’ Women and Legal Education conferences. Law students Molly Bowen,
Anna Gracey, Brent Harrison, Michelle Marcove, Jessica Mayo, Jon Mott-Restivo, and
Nick Rosinia all provided excellent research and/or editorial assistance. All mistakes are
my own; you may contact me at mquinn@wulaw.wustl.edu.
1
This work serves as the foundation for my book project in progress, MAE C. QUINN,
FEMINIST LEGAL REALISM? REALISTIC WOMEN IN THE TRENCHES, ON THE BENCHES, AND
BEYOND (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Quinn, FEMINIST
LEGAL REALISM?] . It also expands on my initial thoughts on this subject in Mae C.
Quinn, Further (Ms.)Understanding Legal Realism: Rescuing Judge Anna Moscowitz
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Jurisprudence. The story of Legal Realism has been retold for decades. Authors have dedicated countless books,2 law review articles,3 and blog posts4
to the subject. Legal and other scholars repeatedly have attempted to define
better the movement and ascertain its adherents. Although the usual suspects—Karl Llewellyn, Roscoe Pound, and Jerome Frank—are almost always a part of the conversation, surprisingly few agree on the totality of
Realism’s personage or parameters. The lists of those considered realists—
and there are many—are constantly expanding and contracting. The movement’s teachings and implications are ever-evaluated. In all of this alleged
evolution, however, one thing has remained constant: male-centered descriptions of Legal Realism have occupied the center of the discussion.
Arguing that this master narrative should not hold, this Article challenges traditional understandings of Realism. It offers a gendered account of
the realist enterprise that shifts those in legal history’s margins to the mainstream. Focusing on the realistic work of one such woman, Anna Moscowitz Kross—one of the country’s first women law graduates, practicing
lawyers, and judges—this Article examines the work of realistic women in
law during and after the realist era’s heyday. Looking beyond the leading
lights of the Ivy League, Ivory Tower, and prestigious courts, this account is
interested in the work of women like Kross who were in community
trenches and involved with the trial-court benches. Such women, who remarkably have remained under history’s radar, pressed to create their own
Kross, 88 TEX. L. REV. 43 (2009), available at www.texaslrev.com/sites/default/files/
seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso43.pdf [hereinafter Quinn, Further
(Ms.)Understanding].
2
See, e.g., WOUTER DE BEEN, LEGAL REALISM REGAINED (William Twining ed.,
2008); CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW: MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds., 2003); BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (2007) [hereinafter LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE] ; BRIAN Z.
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010) [hereinafter TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE] ; E.W.
THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, PRACTICAL REASONING AND
PRINCIPLES (2005).
3
See, e.g., Eric Engle, The Fake Revolution: Understanding Legal Realism, 47
WASHBURN L.J. 653 (2008); Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915 (2005); Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James
Coolidge Carter and the Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 149 (2007); David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal
Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433 (2010); William P.
Marshall, Judicial Accountability in a Time of Legal Realism, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
937 (2006); Victoria Nourse & Gregory Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a
New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (2009); Pierre
Schlag, Formalism and Realism in Ruins (Mapping the Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L.
REV. 195 (2009); Robert Weisberg, Did Legal Realism Engage the Real World of Criminal Law?, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 293 (2009).
4
See, e.g., Dan Ernst, Llewellyn Lives, LEGAL HISTORY BLOG (Oct. 5, 2008, 12:32
PM), http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2008/10/llewellyn-lives.html; William Ford,
Legal Realism, Herman Pritchett, and the Great Divide, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES (June
22, 2006, 8:54 PM), http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/06/legal_
realism_p.html.
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practical jurisprudence rooted in realistic projects in the first half of the
twentieth century.
Like other women of her generation, Kross did not just talk about Realism; she actually did Realism. As outsiders and reformist lawyers, Kross
and her cohorts sought to address social problems they believed contributed
to the oppression, marginalization, and day-to-day inequality experienced by
women, families, and communities. Authentically interdisciplinary and interactive, Kross sought practical solutions for the real issues of real people
with whom she personally connected.
While her modes of operating found parallels in the work of her male
realist contemporaries, they stood in stark contrast, too. Her less academically-driven activities, sustained community-based efforts, and strikingly
collaborative approaches differed from the heady, removed, and largely exclusionary work of male realists at the time. Even after being appointed to
the bench, Kross found ways to establish agency without entirely adopting
the hierarchical and traditional norms of the institutions in which she
worked. Accordingly, her realist legal work—its values, practices, and
goals—can be seen as a feminist enterprise. Thus, it can serve to shed new
light not only on traditional understandings of realism, but also on feminism.
This new history not only offers an account of women as realists, but of
realists as activists.
In this way, this Article serves as a two-way mirror—reflecting on our
realist past while looking into our feminist future. It suggests that those who
are currently grappling with the realities of feminism and the law—particularly within the academy—may draw some lessons from the life and experiences of Kross and her contemporaries. Like feminists today, in the
shadows of constructed categories and lists, Kross and her cohorts also
sought to establish their own agency and identities while challenging lived
injustice. And although no path is ever perfect, their generally more rooted,
communal, and practical approaches to feminist concerns—through activism
and not just academics, doing beyond talking—may provide a potent shot in
the arm for those feeling the frustration of feminism’s limited impact on the
law and its institutions as lived.
In the end, a return to on-the-ground practices and applied methods that
largely focus on pragmatic improvement, inclusion, and humane connection,
rather than supremacy of ideas, Ivory Tower acceptance, and ego-driven accolades, may help revive feminist projects that have become increasingly
individualistic, inaccessible, and nihilistic. As such, this work suggests a
new legal realist history, as well as a new feminist jurisprudence agenda, one
that may be called Feminist Legal Realism.5
5
To date, I have found no references to the term “Feminist Legal Realism” in legal
scholarship or otherwise. “Feminist Realism” has been used, however, in the literary,
artistic, and religious realms. See, e.g., MOLLY YOUNGKIN, FEMINIST REALISM AT THE
`
FIN DE SIECLE
: THE INFLUENCE OF THE LATE-VICTORIAN WOMEN’S PRESS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NOVEL (2007) (describing, in a positive light, literary representations of
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This Article begins by sketching the traditional androcentric account of
Realism, recounting in Part II the story of the legal realists that focuses on
men within the academy and elite courts “searching” for a more practical
jurisprudence during the 1930s and 1940s. It explains, however, that despite
the group’s purported focus on the pragmatic, its methods were largely removed from real-world experience. And in the course of their intellectual
debates, its adherents often engaged in biting critiques that prevented cohesion and forward movement. These features contributed to the program’s
less-than-stellar showing, which left much of its work unfinished.
Part III of this Article describes how the traditional tale has continued
with later critical legal movements—also allegedly committed to change—
picking up where the known realists left off. For instance, the Law and
Society movement of the 1950s and 1960s is well known as Realism’s first
offspring. Critical Legal Studies, which emerged in the 1970s, is considered
the progenitor of Law and Society. And Feminist Jurisprudence, it is said,
was born of Critical Legal Studies in the 1980s, providing an additional
layer in the standard genealogy.
While all of these movements also sought to deconstruct legal norms
and engage in reformatory efforts, like the traditional realists, their members—as if part of an unbroken familial cycle—repeatedly returned to impractical practices of the realist campaign. By retreating to the Ivory Tower,
removing themselves from the real world and engaging in wars of words,
members of these movements largely worked to reify some of the very structures they sought to challenge. Part III posits that such replication of hegemonic norms is particularly puzzling in the case of feminists who pledged at
the outset of their activities to embrace context, build community, and address lived inequality, while spending a great deal of time expressly distancing themselves from the traditional realists. Indeed, the Feminist
Jurisprudence camp sought to reject connections to the realists, arguing they
were not part of the same male lineage. Rather, the realist movement was
seen by legal feminists as insufficiently radical in its methods and unsuccessful in bringing about real change.
In all of this protest, however, legal feminists have failed to consider
the possibility of another account of the realist experience—one that acknowledges the work of radical realist women who did change systems and
lives. Part IV begins to offer this alternative account, recovering the history
of one forgotten woman in law—Anna Moscowitz Kross. A lawyer, judge,
and public official, Kross was part of the realist enterprise working from
outside of the law’s elite institutions. But like other women who were enwomen’s agency); Serena Anderlini-D’Onofrio, Is Feminism Realism Possible? A Theory
of Labial Eros and Mimesis, 8 J. GENDER STUD. 159, 160 (1999) (proposing “a notion of
mimesis based on female embodiedness and eros,” for instance, by replacing phallic mimesis with labia-centric representations); Beverly Wildung Harrison, Feminist Realism,
46 CHRISTIANITY & CRISIS 235 (1986) (attempting to construct a Christian feminist moral
agenda with regard to the issue of abortion).
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gaged in such efforts, she was left off of Realism’s lists and out of legal
history’s canon. I argue that her work, and the work of others like her,
should be seen as Feminist Legal Realism.
In Part V of this Article, I explore some of the implications of this new
narrative, suggesting that feminist legal history may serve as an important
site of activism not only by rewriting the past of legal movements in this
country, but also by helping us to rethink the future. Feminist Legal Realism
may offer today’s legal feminists a new way of working for transformation,
encouraging them to abandon mere debates about words on paper and unkind attacks on fellow legal feminists. Rather, by embracing Feminist Legal
Realism’s commitment to action and activism, contemporary legal feminists
may find a new line to their lineage as well as a way forward.
II. THE STANDARD LEGAL REALIST STORY: A GENEALOGY
Legal Realism has been called one of the most significant legal movements in the United States.6 As a master narrative,7 Realism’s roots run deep
in the American and international legal imagination.8 Even for most skeptics, its lore is hard to ignore.9
To date, legal realist accounts have focused on the life and work of
high-profile and high-ranking men in the legal academy and courts who attempted to make better sense of law in the United States during the first half
of the last century.10 Perhaps most frequently and fundamentally, Realism
6
LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2, at 1; see also CULTURAL
ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE LAW: MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM, supra
note 2, at 6; WILLIAM W. FISHER III, MORTON J. HOROWITZ & THOMAS A. REED, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xiv (1993) [hereinafter FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM].
7
See JUDITH M. BENNETT, HISTORY MATTERS: PATRIARCHY AND THE CHALLENGE OF
FEMINISM 130 (2006) (“A master narrative is, in short, what everyone must know about a
specific historical period”); see also id. at 53 (noting the “repetitious power of a master
narrative”).
8
William Twining, Talk About Realism, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 329, 381 (1985) (“[T]he
Realist Movement is of enormous historical significance and interest, in the United States
and beyond, in terms of both particular achievements and a general but extremely elusive
kind of ‘influence.’ ”); see also Rodger D. Citron, The Nuremberg Trials and American
Jurisprudence: The Decline of Legal Realism, The Revival of Natural Law, and the Development of Legal Process Theory, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 385, 386 (2006) (stating that
critics characterized the legal realist movement as fruitless, and that in the early 1930s,
Realism was not a dominant movement, but prominent because it was extensively
discussed).
9
Anthony D’Amato, Legal Realism Explains Nothing, 1 WASH. U. JURISPRUDENCE
REV. 1, 9 (2009) (describing Legal Realism as a “self-fulfilling prophecy” perpetuated
by legal academia); Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2054, 2072 n.80 (1995) (“The legacy of legal realism is difficult to estimate or
evaluate.”).
10
See, e.g., FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6; N.E.H. HULL,
ROSCOE POUND & KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE
(1997); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 1927–1960 (1986) [hereinafter KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE] ; LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 2;
see also Twining, supra note 8.
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has been framed as arguing against mechanical application of laws by
courts, instead urging mindfulness of the law’s interpretation and import in
the real world.11 Thus, at times both descriptive and normative in their efforts, legal realists offered a new take on judging. They also advocated
broader acceptance of emerging non-formalistic legal thinking and
methods.12
A. A History of Elite Men Searching for a Practical Jurisprudence
This traditional description is supported by the work of Karl Llewellyn,
said by some to be the father of Legal Realism.13 With his 1930 essay, A
Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step,14 Llewellyn instigated an intense
realist conversation that spanned many years.15 In Realistic Jurisprudence,
Llewellyn, then a Columbia law professor, used Harvard Law Dean Roscoe
Pound’s challenge to mechanical application of law as Realism’s springboard.16 Llewellyn’s work went on to acknowledge the present “complexity
11

Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOLAW AND LEGAL THEORY 50, 50 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson
eds., 2005) [hereinafter Leiter, American Legal Realism] (“[United States Realists]
were reacting against the dominant ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ or ‘formalism’ of their
day.”); see also TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE, supra note 2, at
27.
12
See William A. Edmundson, Introduction to THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, supra note 11 (focusing on the descriptive feature
of Realism and its practice-related implications); FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at xi–xv (offering insights on Realism as practiced in the courts and
propounded by the academy). Of course, such accounts cover much of the period when
Anna Moscowitz Kross was implementing these kinds of ideas. See infra Part IV.
13
FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 49 (noting that Llewellyn was “acknowledged [as] the chief Realist”).
14
Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV.
431 (1930) [hereinafter Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence].
15
See FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 49–52; KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 3 (describing the realists as engaging in
debates throughout the 1920s and 1930s).
16
FISHER ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 6, at 49–52; HULL, supra
note 10, at 140–46 (recounting how Pound’s work served as the catalyst for Llewellyn’s
initial assertions about Legal Realism). Pound is also credited with conceiving sociological jurisprudence to describe a slightly earlier movement that called for pragmatism in the
law. See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908);
see also MICHAEL WILLRICH, CITY OF COURTS: SOCIALIZING JUSTICE IN PROGRESSIVE
ERA CHICAGO 104–15 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2003). But, as borne out by the work of
feminist legal historians such as Felice Batlan and Gwen Hoerr Jordan, well before Pound
women in law were engaged in community activities and lawyering strategies that quite
clearly reflected sociological jurisprudence’s definition and themes. See infra note 61
(describing the sociological jurisprudence movement as the precursor to Legal Realism
which is traditionally described as a male-only story, too). Apparently these women did
not stake out their territory as a movement or school of thought, or perhaps their names
simply did not gain the traction and play of parallel androcentric legal movements. See,
e.g., Gwen Hoerr Jordan, Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra Bradwell to Hillary Clinton, 9 NEV. L.J. 580, 600 (2009) (“[Women] law activists [of the late 1800s]
never formalized their law reform movement by naming it or establishing a separate,
specific organization.”).
PHY OF
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of law,” challenging statutes and appellate decisions as the “center of reference for discussion.”17 He urged a new focal point for legal discussions that
would zero in on “the area of contact between judicial (or official) behavior
and the behavior of laymen.”18 Law itself, with an emphasis on “observable
behavior” in the community, needed to be seen as “all of society, and all of
man in society.”19
Pound responded, simultaneously acknowledging the strength of these
ideas, and suggesting their limits. Not only was the notion of law as indeterminate not original, but Pound feared the work of “younger teachers of
law,” like Llewellyn, dwelled too much on the illusory features of the legal
landscape.20 “[S]uch critical activity, important as it is,” Pound argued, “is
not the whole of jurisprudence . . . .”21 He doubted whether a “science of
law” that both described the legal order and developed forward-thinking
knowledge about it could ever be built out of nothing more than
“criticism[s].” 22
Llewellyn replied with his 1931 paper, Some Realism about Realism,23
chiding Pound in sharp terms, perhaps setting the stage and tone of the Legal
Realism movement for years to come.24 Llewellyn defended the work of
“new realists” like himself.25 According to Llewellyn, there were at least
twenty law professors, judges, and lawyers—all men26—who shared in his
thinking and were engaged in similar innovative work.27 As for their normative agenda, Llewellyn said that realist reformers called for implementation
of legal rules in a way that acknowledged their impact on the ground, as well
as a conception of law “as a means to a social end and not as an end in
itself.”28 He further acknowledged that many within the group were looking
17

Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 443–45.
Id. at 442–43.
19
Id. at 464, 465.
20
Roscoe Pound, The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697,
697–705 (1931).
21
Id. at 699.
22
Id.
23
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (1931) [hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism
About Realism] (discussing the “Is” and “Ought” features of the realist enterprise).
24
According to Fisher, Horowitz, and Reed, this “famous exchange . . . may be the
best short guide to the Realist movement, its strengths and flaws alike.” FISHER ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 49.
25
See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 23, at 1224, passim; see
also LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 16 (1996) [hereinafter KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM] (“By the realists’ accounts, the doctrinal scholarship of
traditionalists erred in treating law as a system of neutral rules that judges mechanically
applied to reach the one legally ‘correct’ decision.”).
26
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 23, at 1227.
27
See id. at 1227. Somewhat ironically and presciently, in an effort to distance this
modern movement from prior legal thinking, Frank described the latter as having a
“childish desire to have a fixed father-controlled universe, free of chance and error.”
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 37 (1930).
28
See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 23, at 1236; see also
KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 16 (“[R]ealists debunked the rule of law
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outside of the law to social science to try to give greater form and substance
to this approach.29
Llewellyn claimed legal realists did not have one voice or message.30
Yet he and his contemporaries spilled a great deal of ink over the years
attempting to arrive at some more distilled understanding of the realist enterprise, as well as to develop best approaches to Realism. Thus, vigorous,
sometimes vitriolic, realist exchanges took place across the pages of the nation’s elite law school journals over the next two decades, taking the conversation in a variety of sometimes competing critical directions.
For instance, while Llewellyn’s writings called for greater understanding of how the law operated in the trenches of society,31 others wrote articles
calling attention to particular areas of doctrine ripe for realist infusion.32
Some scholars urged application of specific social-scientific methods, suggesting practical approaches to the law as applied.33 And yet others, most
notably Jerome Frank, advocated changes in the law school environment and
curriculum.34 Meanwhile, Llewellyn was compiling and exchanging his lists
as part of an effort to improve it. In undermining the predictive force of age-old legal
rules, for example, realists often spoke of laying the groundwork for new ones.”).
29
See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 23; see also KALMAN,
LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 16 (Realists believed “improved legal rules would
utilize the insights of the social sciences and increase lawyers’ proficiency at predicting
the course of law.”).
30
See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, supra note 23, at 1251.
31
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 78
(1962) (“[O]ne concerned with law . . . must center his thought on behavior, on the
interactions between the behavior of the law-officials and behavior of laymen.”); Karl N.
Llewellyn, The Normative, the Legal, and the Law-Jobs: The Problem of Juristic Method,
49 YALE L.J. 1355, 1356–57 (1940).
32
See, e.g., Thurman Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Antitrust Procedure,
47 YALE L.J. 1294 (1938) (renowned New Deal “trust-buster” and distinguished antitrust
scholar) (looking at the economic reality behind antitrust laws); Walter Wheeler Cook,
‘Characterization’ in the Conflict of Laws, 51 YALE L.J. 191, 194 (1941) (pioneering
choice-of-law scholar and co-father of the “local law” theory) (arguing that theoretical
writers have forgotten the purposes conflict of law rules were designed to serve); Arthur
L. Corbin, Jural Relations and their Classifications, 30 YALE L.J 226, 226–27 (1921)
(avowed non-realist and seminal contracts scholar) (stating that the law is determined by
what societal agents do as much as by the rules expressing what those agents should do);
Leon Green, Causal Relation in Legal Liability—In Tort, 36 YALE L.J. 513 (1927) (realist tort law trailblazer) (examining whether the goals of tort law are met in case law and
the limitations of these goals).
33
See HULL, SEARCHING FOR AN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 10, at 284
(describing a rift between Llewellyn, Frank, and others, on the one hand, and Hessel
Yntema, Wheeler Cook, Herman Oliphant, and Underhill Moore, on the other, around the
issue of application of particular social scientific methods in legal studies); KALMAN,
LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 17–19 (describing Underhill Moore’s commitment to behavioral psychology and Llewellyn’s additional insights that sociology, economics, history, and other social sciences might be useful to a law reform program); see
also KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 18 (describing Frank as one of
several who did not believe anthropology as a social science was relevant or helpful to
the realist agenda).
34
See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
227–46 (1950). See generally Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J.
1303 (1947) (arguing law schools should expose students to practicing law, not merely
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of those believed to be part of the realist movement.35 Thus, somewhat ironically, in supposedly pressing for realistic and pragmatic approaches to improve the delivery of justice, realist adherents became increasingly mired in
academic rhetoric as the movement unfolded.
In its fervor, realist discourse reached the level of rancor. Historians
N.E.H. Hull and Laura Kalman have painstakingly detailed the in-fighting
that took place around the idea of Realism at the nation’s most prestigious
law schools.36 Not only did many resist Realism’s taking hold within the
legal academy, but its followers and promoters battled for supremacy in defining its contours.37 Rivalries between the elite law schools reached a crescendo as players moved from institution to institution, based in part on
support for their ideas.38 In the context of all of this criticism and negativity,
Realism struggled to construct a coherent, positive program.39
Realists’ disputes raged on for the next several years without, many
would argue, making substantive inroads.40 For instance, Llewellyn’s call for
studying it in the library); Jerome Frank, Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA.
L. REV. 907 (1933) (arguing law schools should teach more than rules and principles).
Frank, a lecturer at Yale who went on to serve in the New Deal Administration and as a
judge on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, is often credited with pioneering the cause
of clinical legal education. See Margaret Martin Barry, John C. Dubin & Peter A. Joy,
Clinical Legal Education for this Millennium: The Third Wave, 7 CLINICAL L. REV. 1, 8
(2000). Frank was followed by other realists interested in changing the legal education
system. See, e.g., Herman E. Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 74
(1928) (describing the “orgy of overgeneralization” at American law schools); cf. ROBERT M. HUTCHINS, SOME OBSERVATIONS ON AMERICAN EDUCATION xii (1956) (describing “the futility of vocational training”).
35
See HULL, supra note 10, at 205 (in response to a list offered by Pound, Llewellyn
and Frank worked together to create their own list with different names). By 1931, Llewellyn’s list spanned nearly fifty names, up from twenty. See id., app. at 343–46.
36
See HULL, supra note 10, at 173–222; KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, 19271960, supra note 10, at 55–62.
37
John Henry Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies: An Afterword, 36 STAN. L. REV. 673,
673 (1984) [hereinafter Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies] (describing the “making of
handcrafted definitions of what Realism really was”).
38
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 313–14 n.85 (1992) (describing Yntema, Oliphant,
and Cook’s development of the Institute of Law at Johns Hopkins University, an institution devoted to the scientific study of law, which Cook viewed as more fruitful than the
teaching of law); KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 112–13; LOOKING
BACK AT LAW’S CENTURY 343 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) (describing universities
battling to see who could hire more of these “mutineers”).
39
Realism’s agenda was also impacted by events outside of the academy. First, President Franklin D. Roosevelt plucked many known realists for his New Deal administration. See KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 17. Later “Red Scare”
intimidation tactics, led by J. Edgar Hoover, targeting liberal university professors also
quieted many academics. HULL, supra note 10, at 310–20; see also Sonya G. Smith,
Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley College: The Scope of Academic Freedom Within the
Context of Sexual Harassment Claims and In-Class Speech, 25 J.C. & U.L. 1, 9 n.39
(1998) (indicating that 798 undergraduate professors had been accused of Communist
activities). Both Pound and Llewellyn came under investigation by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; Pound cleared the FBI’s screens while Llewellyn was brought in for interviews. HULL, supra note 10, at 317–21.
40
See, e.g., KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 230.
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greater understanding of the law on the ground had gotten him interested in
the Cheyenne Indian nation. He believed the Cheyenne maintained “a legal
system that was less complicated and more direct than the common law system,” providing an ideal testing site for realist approaches in a quasi-laboratory situation.41 And so, he partnered with E. Adamson Hoebel, an
anthropologist, to study the Cheyenne nation over a span of two years.42 In
the end, Llewellyn offered observations about Cheyenne legal experiences in
his 1941 publication, The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence.43 He described a community with deep “local law
ways” that allowed for humane “[l]eeway” in resolution of disputes, permitting local decision-makers to “feel[] the way through to a solution.”44
Inconsistent with realist tenets, Llewellyn performed nearly all of the
project’s work at arm’s length. Despite his own suggestions to the contrary,45
he visited the reservation only one time during a ten-day field study.46 Ultimately, Llewellyn drew his conclusions primarily from his colleague’s field
notes.47 And given the text’s esoteric tone and lack of applicability to the
law as lived in the rest of the country, at least one scholar saw the long
awaited text as a great disappointment.48 It was clear that much of Llewellyn’s attention during this time was not on the well-being of the Cheyenne
people, “primitives” as he called them in the text’s title, but on using them
for his ends. Indeed, during this same period he spent more time on a decidedly different and more mainstream project—drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code.49 Llewellyn’s Cheyenne project, therefore, serves as an
41

HULL, supra note 10, at 286.
See John M. Conley & William M. O’Barr, A Classic in Spite of Itself: The Cheyenne Way and the Case Method in Legal Anthropology, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 179,
186–87 (2004) (describing how Hoebel performed most of the fieldwork “on the ground”
work, while Llewellyn provided much of the method and theory for the project).
43
KARL N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT
AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941) [hereinafter THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE].
44
See id. at 317, 334, 337–38.
45
Id. at viii (claiming the book is “the result of the joint efforts of the authors, one of
whom is a specialist in law, the other in anthropology. Both are students of human behavior: proponents of realistic sociology.”).
46
HULL, supra note 10, at 313; Conley and O’Barr, supra note 42, at 186. He made
this visit with his former research assistant and then wife, Emma Corstvet, whom he
referred to as an unrecognized “Co-author” in the book’s dedication notes. THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 43, at v
(thanking Corstvet in the book’s dedication notes for her sociological insights while in the
field).
47
HULL, supra note 10, at 290 (explaining that Llewllyn had Hoebel inquire about
such topics as “aggression and fraud, disputed right, disputed fact . . . and law crafts and
law craftsmen”).
48
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 18 (noting that when Llewellyn’s Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence was finally
published, Jerome Frank “announced that Llewellyn would have better spent his time
studying the law-ways of Tammany Hall braves than the Cheyenne Indians”).
49
See HULL, supra note 10, at 295–300. Llewellyn and Corstvet divorced five years
after their work together on THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMI-
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example of the ways in which Realism was seen as a failed movement,50 or
at least left certain business unfinished.51
Despite its unfulfilled promises, in the years since Realism’s apex, academics have continued to robustly debate its meaning, as well as which
names belong on its registry. For instance, in their important anthology
American Legal Realism, Harvard Law professors William Fisher and Martin Horowitz, along with attorney Thomas Reed, claim that “the task of deciding precisely which authors and works should be accorded the label
Realist is not . . . simple,” as “the scope of the Realist movement has
been—and undoubtedly will continue to be—controverted.”52
For Fisher, Horowitz, and Reed, the “heart of the movement was an
effort to define and discredit classical legal theory and practice and to offer
in their place a more philosophically and politically enlightened jurisprudence. All of the lawyers, judges, and legal scholars who contributed to that
project should, in our view, be considered Realists.”53 Accordingly, they
claim to have been somewhat expansive in their designations.54 Yet, their
proposed list of realists fails to include a single woman lawyer, judge, or
scholar who was engaged in the realist enterprise.
Recently, a more nuanced strand of this narrative has emerged that in
part challenges clear delineation of insiders and outsiders in the realist
group. In his new work, Brian Tamanaha suggests that overgeneralizations
have resulted in a false divide between those considered realists and formalTIVE JURISPRUDENCE. See David Ray Papke, How the Cheyenne Indians Wrote Article 2
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1457, 1470 (1997). Llewellyn then
married another former student, Soia Mentschikoff, who helped him draft the UCC. Id.
Mentschikoff went on to become a Chicago Law professor, and later Dean of the University of Miami School of Law. Robert Whitman, Soia Mentschikoff and Karl Llewellyn:
Moving Together to the University of Chicago Law School, 24 CONN. L. REV. 1119,
1119, 1124 n.18 (1992). As I plan to further explore in my text in progress, FEMINIST
LEGAL REALISM?, supra note 1, both Corstvet and Mentschikoff might also be seen as
part of Feminist Legal Realism’s legacy.
50
David Marcus, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Legal Realism as a Jurisprudence of Law Reform, 44 GA. L. REV. 433, 437 (2010) (recounting the “familiar story
about the failure of legal realism”); Steven M. Quevedo, Formalist and Instrumentalist
Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 119, 120 (1985) (“[F]or all of its
prominence, the formalism/instrumentalism distinction has proven elusive in recent jurisprudence . . . [and] has failed to bear intellectual fruit when put to work by legal historians . . . .”); see also Ann Scales, The Emergence of Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95
YALE L.J. 1373, 1400 (1986).
51
KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10, at 230 (“Intellectually, realism
had not proved significant; pedagogically, it had not fulfilled its promise.”); Twining,
supra note 8, at 382–84 (suggesting that features of the realist endeavor are not yet complete). Indeed, just as the Supreme Court was entering into one of its most “activist” eras
under the leadership of Chief Justice Earl Warren, arguably reaching beyond the literal
letter of the law in an effort to improve real world circumstances for citizens, realist
activities as traditionally understood began to wind down. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE, supra note 10, at 201–28.
52
FISHER ET AL., supra note 6, at xiii.
53
Id. at xiii–xiv.
54
KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 13 (describing the work of Fisher,
Horowitz, and Reed as a “big-tent conception” of Legal Realism).
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ists.55 Thus, he urges exploration of the common ground shared by decades
of judges and others who have thought about judging.56 Tamanaha offers a
list of “realist” themes as possibly unifying legal thinkers and actors over
time, even beyond the era described as the traditional legal realist age.57
Here again, however, Tamanaha’s rethinking fails to mention the work of
women in law—including Anna Moscowitz Kross—as possibly contributing
to these or related goals, historically or contemporarily.58
Even Kalman and Hull, women who have made important contributions
to the realist narrative, offer an essentially all-male account in their important books on the subject.59 It could easily seem, then, as well-known historian of jurisprudence William Twining claimed, that “[o]ne of the few
generalizations that can be confidently made about the realists is that they
were American, white, and male.”60 Indeed, to date, no comprehensive account of American Realism has meaningfully acknowledged women as contributing to such an agenda during the project’s apex or beyond.61
55

TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE, supra note 2, at 85–90.
See id. at 186. But see Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What
is the Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1646110 (critiquing Tamanaha’s critique).
57
TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE, supra note 2, at 187–96.
58
Id.; see also Brian Tamanaha, A Vision of Social-Legal Change: Rescuing Ehrlich
from ‘Living Law’, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297, 297 (2011) (“[r]escuing” another
forgotten male realist through biography); cf. Quinn, Further (Ms.)Understanding Legal
Realism, supra note 1, at 44 (pointing out the lack of women in Tamanaha’s reformulation
of the history of Realism).
59
See HULL, supra note 10; KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE, supra note 10. In
her later work, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism, Kalman’s analysis of the “bigtent” theory for Realism espoused by Horowitz and company suggests that Walton Hamilton, Thomas Powell, and Felix Frankfurther would make the expanded cut. KALMAN,
LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 250 n.2. Again there is no suggestion that the
expanded conception might include women in law. See id.
60
Twining, supra note 8, at 333. It is worth noting that Twining continues, in a tone
of jest, “and even then one hears the voice of Soia Mentschikoff growling, ‘What about
me?’” Id. Twining also goes on to suggest that “[m]ost historians would probably agree
that it is sensible to treat figures like . . . Mentschikoff [among others] . . . as successors
or followers who belong to a different generation” than traditional realists. Id. at 341–42.
61
As noted earlier, Felice Batlan has traced the careers of women who were contributors to the sociological jurisprudence effort, an antecedent to the Legal Realism movement. See generally Felice Batlan, Notes from the Margins: Florence Kelley and the
Making of Sociological Jurisprudence, in 2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND METHODS ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HOROWITZ
(Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2010) (recounting the reform efforts of
Florence Kelley in New York City during the beginning of the twentieth century); Felice
Batlan, Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: The Settlement Houses, Sociological Jurisprudence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 235
(2006) (arguing that women settlement workers played groundbreaking legal roles at the
turn of the twentieth century). Additionally, Gwen Hoerr Jordan has recently argued that
Myra Bradwell’s work during the late 1800s also may be seen as the precursor to sociological jurisprudence. See Jordan, Agents of (Incremental) Change, supra note 16, at
604–12; Gwen Hoerr Jordan, “Horror of a Woman”: Myra Bradwell, the 14th Amendment, and the Gendered Origins of Sociological Jurisprudence, 42 AKRON L. REV. 1201,
1218–29 (2009). Thus, this Article and book in progress can be seen as part of the
gendered legal history being (re)covered and (re)presented by Batlan, Jordan, Tracy

R

56

R

R
R

R
R

R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG101.txt

2012]

unknown

Seq: 13

12-JAN-12

Feminist Legal Realism

9:35

13

Yet, somewhat ironically, it is from the continuation of this masculine
narrative that today’s feminist legal scholars largely take their cue; their
work is seen as a direct descendant of the traditional antiformalist tale. As
described in the next section, the dominant account of Legal Realism reportedly served as a starting point for the Law and Society movement. The Law
and Society movement, it is said, begat Critical Legal Studies as a school of
thought. And it is out of the rib of Critical Legal Studies that modern Feminist Jurisprudence is said to be born. Thus, many feminist legal scholars
have, at least implicitly, accepted the traditional framing of the running realist narrative, its cyclical nature, and their part in it. This is so despite early
protests by feminists who sought to reject offered comparisons to the realists. Even contemporary legal feminists fail to consider the possibility of a
female-gendered realist narrative, with all of the opportunities that may be
provided by such an alternative genealogy.
B. The Unfolding of the Traditional Male-Centered Tale
1. Law and Society Movement
As the standard story goes, where the men of Realism left off, their
Law and Society brethren picked up.62 As noted by one adherent, “[l]aw
and society research in the 1960s extended this [realist] critique, pushing a
progressive agenda that sought to use law instrumentally to achieve distribu-

Thomas, and others, my co-authors of a related project: FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND LAW (Tracy A. Thomas and Tracey Jean Boisseau eds., 2011).
Future projects will need to explore connections between this earlier group of women and
feminist legal realists. See also infra Part V.
62
By providing the following synopses of the Law and Society, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Jurisprudence movements, in some ways I engage in the same positionbased, reductionist accounting I seek to challenge. But what I offer is a take on the
traditional telling. As the basic themes of this project suggest, I am fully cognizant that
historic moments and movements can be understood in a multiplicity of ways, and no
storyteller is ever free from her own bias or embeddedness in a constructed reality—even
when pointing out the supposed implicit judgments and constructed subjectivities of
others. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 47, 52 (1988) [hereinafter Minow, Feminist Reason] (“Feminists are no more free
than others from the stereotypes in cultural thought.”); David M. Trubek, Back to the
Future: The Short, Happy Life of the Law and Society Movement, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
11, 24 (1990) [hereinafter Trubek, Back to the Future] (“[T]here have always been
many different currents of thought about law, society and social science in the movement
. . . [and those involved] came from very different starting points and have very different
goals for the enterprise.”).
Thus, I further concede that what follows is an overly simplistic overview of deconstructionist philosophies that emerged and were carried forward by feminist legal theorists. But part of the critique offered in this project relates to the insistence by modern
feminist scholars and others on finely parsing nuanced, non-substantive differences
among these approaches that have resulted in a maddening level of complexity, a small
group of insiders who can share in jargon-laden conversations, and an apparent lack of
affirmative progress in the movement.
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tional justice.”63 Socio-legal scholars, many with connections to the University of Wisconsin, built on the skeptical tradition of the realists.64 They
called for further deconstruction of claims made within the field of law and
sought to use their evaluations as a “means [to achieve] a more just
society.”65
Much of the critical scholarly work that emerged during this period
sought to provide a window into problematic locations in law where, in the
real world, formal rules fell short of achieving their purported aims.66 In this
way, Law and Society work was similar to that of realists who feared there
were interstices between “paper rules” and the “realities of implementative
practice.”67 Also consistent with the realist legacy, most on-the-ground insights and research came from social scientists and not traditional law
professors.68 For instance, more than criminal law scholars, criminologists
were well known for studies that demonstrated the shortcomings of criminal
law and procedure to achieve substantive justice.69 And emerging law
school clinics, mostly run by non-tenure-track law faculty, were trying to fill

63
Paul Schiff Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story: Notes Toward a Nonskeptical
Approach to Legal/Cultural Analysis, in CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND
THE LAW: MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 114 (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds.,
2003).
64
See Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 62, at 11 (describing courses offered by
four faculty members at the University of Wisconsin Law School that focused on law and
society).
65
Berman, supra note 63, at 106–07.
66
Joel Handler et al., A Roundtable on New Legal Realism, Microanalysis of Institutions, and the New Governance: Exploring Convergences and Differences, 2005 WIS. L.
REV. 479, 498 (2005) (“Perhaps the central preoccupation of this scholarship has been
the relation between formal law and the informal social circumstances that mediate its
practical effects.”).
67
See G. Edward White, From Realism to Critical Legal Studies: A Truncated Intellectual History, 40 SW. L.J. 819, 831 (1986). Because of this similarity between Law and
Society and realist work, socio-legal projects undertaken during the second half of the
twentieth century are frequently referred to as “gap studies.” See, e.g., Mark Kessler,
Review: Lawyers and Social Change in the Postmodern World, 29 LAW & SOC’Y REV.
769, 771 (1995); see also Thomas D. Russell, The Shape of the Michigan River as Viewed
from the Land of Sweatt v. Painter and Hopwood, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 507, 511
(2000) (“[I]f legislators passed a law guaranteeing a chicken in every pot, a gap study
would check pots looking for chickens; the term gap stems from the frequency with
which researchers have found pots outnumbering chickens.”).
68
KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 17 (“[T]hough the realists made
‘law and social science’ their mantra, they never got very far in their attempts to integrate
the two.”). See also Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 62, at 20.
69
See, e.g., JEROME H. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (Christine Cardone ed., 3d ed. 1994) (renowned sociologist, New
York University Law professor, and law and society scholar); Richard D. Schwartz &
Sonya Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 274 (1967) (Schwartz, a law
professor at Syracuse University and founding editor of the Law & Society Review, holds
a Ph.D. but not a J.D.; Orleans is a Sociologist); see also ABRAHAM S. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1967); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game:
Organizational Cooptation of a Profession, 1 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 15, 38–39 (1966).
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some of these gaps through court-based challenges.70 Yet the Law and Society movement, in part with the formation of the Law and Society Association in 1965, was very much seen as shaped and influenced by “white
coated” elites of the legal academy.71
Law and Society work also appeared to be based on the assumption that
there was, in fact, some preferred set of rules and laws “out there” to be
ascertained and put in place.72 Even so, more skeptical scholars associated
with the movement wondered whether the law as written and interpreted in
United States courts would ever have the capacity to achieve change.73
Many Law and Society adherents grew disillusioned.74 Thus, not unlike
the legal realist account, differences impeded the forward movement of the
larger project. Perhaps in part due to the changing demographics of law
70
Such instances are described in Juliet M. Brodie’s Little Cases on the Middle
Ground: Teaching Social Justice Lawyering in Neighborhood-Based Community Lawyering Clinics, 15 CLINICAL L. REV. 333, 335 (2009):
In the 1960s, responding to students’ demands for “social relevance,” the notion
of the social justice mission of clinical education “blossomed” but was joined by
a more explicit pedagogical mission and the goal of teaching students not only
lawyering skills, but also lawyering “values” and the need for engagement with
pro bono and other access to justice endeavors.
See also J.P. Ogilvy, Clinical Legal Education: An Annotated Bibliography—Part Three:
Synopses of Articles, Essays, Books, and Book Chapters, 11 CLINICAL L. REV. 101, 225
(2005) (“The societal concern with poverty in the 1960’s coincided with the drive to
provide law students with practical experience. ‘Service model’ clinics were based on the
need for legal help for the poor.”).
71
Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 62, at 7–8. Trubek continued:
The law and development movement was conceived in the 1950s and 1960s when
many in the legal elite believed the law could and should be actively used to
shape society [and] lawyers thought they could devise relatively unproblematic
systems of social governance and transformation. . . . If something was wrong
somewhere in the world, the jurists of the Imperial Age of American Law were
ready to fix it.
Id. at 20–21; cf. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously: Before,
During and after the Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 555, 569 (2007) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously] (“The Law and Society Association
was formed as an intentionally multidisciplinary group of lawyers, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, psychologists, political scientists, and economists who sought to
study law and legal institutions empirically and in context.”).
72
Kessler, supra note 67, at 771 (“Thus, although these [gap] studies portray law as
ineffective in shaping behavior, they also reflect an abiding faith that law, if designed
properly, may contribute significantly to struggles for social justice.”).
73
See, e.g., Trubek, Back to the Future, supra note 62, at 42 (“As the result of over
two decades of gap studies, impact studies, and implementation research, we have come
to doubt the independent power of law to reshape social arrangements.”); cf. Louise G.
Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People: Revisionist Scholarship and Practice, 48 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 983, 984 (1994) [hereinafter Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People].
74
Mauricio Garcı́a-Villegas, Symbolic Power without Symbolic Violence, 55 FLA. L.
REV. 157, 158 (2003) (In the late 1980s, a number of “prominent members of L[aw] &
S[ociety] began to reconceptualize its movement. The aim was to achieve greater critical commitment in opposition to the predominant position, which, according to critics,
was politically and epistemologically perverted through the prevalence of an institutional
viewpoint and a public policy bias.”).
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school faculties, which now included greater numbers of women of all races
and men of color, a new group emerged from Law and Society’s foundation.75 Seeing itself as more critical, the newly declared camp called itself
the Conference on Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”).76
2. Critical Legal Studies
The first Critical Legal Studies conference took place in 1977.77 Many
adherents involved became interested in moving beyond gap studies to applying postmodern and poststructural deconstructive approaches78 of Foucault, Derrida, and others to the law and legal institutions.79 Some also
employed Marxist thinking in their critiques, arguing that law and legal institutions merely worked to reinforce oppressive class structures and maintain stratified inequality through the replication of hegemonic norms.80
There is a striking likeness between CLS, Law and Society, and traditional
legal realist thinkers in their shared desire to debunk myths about written
law, its deployment, and legal institutions.81
75
See KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 94–95 (recounting how an
influx of women and minority law faculty during the late 1970s and early 1980s worked
to challenge the positions held by many white male elites in the legal academy and assumptions of that in-group).
76
See id. at 94 (“The arrival of law and economics and critical legal studies shattered
the liberal consensus.”).
77
Pierre Schlag, Critical Legal Studies, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY 295, 295 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 2009) (describing the event as an
“invitational conference”); see also Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously, supra note 71, at 572 n.69 and accompanying text (describing author’s attendance
at this conference, held at the University of Wisconsin).
78
See KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 82–93; id. at 308 n.58 and
accompanying text (offering that post-structuralist ideas may have been brought to the
fore by younger law faculty who had encountered such thinking in their undergraduate
educations).
79
See Kessler, supra note 67, at 769, 772 (1995) (“Influenced by theorists of ideology and practice, such as Gramsci and Bourdieu, and postmodern writers, like Foucault
and Derrida, this work examines law as a discourse that shapes consciousness by creating
the categories through which the social world is made meaningful.”); see also M.J. Clark,
Deconstruction, Feminism, and Law: Cornell and MacKinnon on Female Subjectivity
and Resistance, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2005) (“For Derrida, concepts
are things, as tactile in their effect as earth and water, as restrictive as chains, and yet as
invisible as ether.”).
80
Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV. 515, 515
(2000); Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously, supra note 71, at 572;
see also Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People, supra note 73, at 984–85 (“The Critical
Legal Studies movement had indicated how the law, as a reflection of the most socially
powerful voices, can subordinate or legitimate the subordination of marginalized
persons.”).
81
Berman, supra note 63, at 115; John Henry Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate,
Opinionated, and Affectionate History of the Conference on Critical Legal Studies, 36
STAN. L. REV. 391, 397 (1984) [hereinafter Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate History]; see also KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 82–83 (describing how
some CLS scholars asserted the new movement’s descendancy from Legal Realism to
claim a “pedigree”).
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As the next generation, however, CLS scholars were not particularly
interested in offering snapshots of problematic locations where law as applied to facts fell short.82 Rather, they questioned these very signifiers.83
Through fine-grained analyses, many of these scholars attempted to dismantle separate notions of law versus society, or individual as opposed to community.84 Their work was thus seen as a radical and deeply critical departure
from mainstream legal academic thinking.
Nevertheless, this conversation, too, became dominated by a handful of
academic insiders.85 As with Realism, a select set of voices—again primarily those of white men comfortably ensconced in the legal academy—drove
CLS discourse across the pages of America’s law journals, attempting to
direct the dialogue on their terms.86 This relatively closed discussion, fully
accessible to a limited few, seemed ever more removed from real world and
community-based experiences. CLS has been criticized, therefore, for becoming a set of depressing, deconstructive debates with little or no positive
takeaway.87
82
John Henry Schlegel, CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, 58 ALA. L. REV. 967, 975
(2007) [hereinafter Schlegel, CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question] (“In our case, what we in
CLS were not were scholars participating in the Law and Society movement whose work
at that time was defined by the endless repetition of research designed to show the gap
between law on the books and the law in action.”).
83
See KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 84; Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 57 (1984) (giving “a brief account of the
impulses that have prompted the Critical scholars to their chosen ways of writing
history”).
84
Kessler, supra note 67, at 772 (“From an ideological perspective, there is no useful
distinction between law and society.”); KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at
86 (declaring that Critical Legal Theorists rejected the rights-focused regime that
emerged during the Warren Court years as “prevent[ing] transformative social change by
perpetuating the dichotomy between the individual and the community”).
85
See Schlegel, CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, supra note 82, at 968 n.7 (“There
was a terrible problem with elitism among us . . . as well as of a fear that outsiders might
undermine our project.”); cf. Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate History, supra note 81,
at 402 (“[I]n an organization that claims to be as deeply antihierarchical as this one does,
behavioral manifestations of traditional notions such as . . . ‘getting ahead is teaching at a
better law school,’ are deeply troubling.”).
86
Reading these writings, one is struck by the club-like feel of it all—a closed conversation among insiders referring to each other on a first-name basis, mirroring the realist communications that filled legal journals several decades before. See, e.g., Schlegel,
CLS Wasn’t Killed by a Question, supra note 82 (referring throughout his piece and with
great informality to his CLS cohorts, including “Fred,” “Bob,” “Duncan,” and
“Laura”).
87
Duke Law School Dean Paul Carrington, one of many who called CLS a “nihilistic” movement, helped lead the parade with a harshly worded speech that was published
in the Washington Post. KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 121–25; see also
Berman, Telling a Less Suspicious Story, supra note 63, at 127 (describing CLS as so
“paranoid” in its style that it “may, over time, have a potentially corrosive effect on
society”); Gordon, supra note 83, at 116 (stating that CLS scholars “have for the most
part not succeeded in communicating their ideas clearly enough to attract much relevant
criticism from outside opponents”); Kessler, supra note 67, at 770 (“Newer postmodern
approaches are criticized as lacking any utility for, or even disabling, transformative
politics.”).

R

R
R

R
R

R

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLG\35-1\HLG101.txt

18

unknown

Seq: 18

Harvard Journal of Law & Gender

12-JAN-12

9:35

[Vol. 35

At least one follower admitted that, like the realists, some CLS scholars
created their own cottage industry (and careers) around simply defining the
movement and attempting to “win” the debate over what “it” was.88 But
with the usual suspects taking up most of the space, many adherents were
implicitly and explicitly pushed into its corners. The dominant group
marginalized some of the very same voices credited with helping start the
movement—including those of women.89
C. Women and Feminist Jurisprudence: The Turn Away From
(and Toward) Legal Realism
With this, many CLS women simply moved out.90 In the 1980s, they
began holding their own meetings at which critical feminist scholarship and
practice were openly and extensively discussed.91 Starting out under the
banner of “Fem-Crits,” the work of this group soon came to be known for
Feminist Jurisprudence or “Feminist Legal Theory.”92 With its birth from
CLS, this movement was and is seen by many as a further unfolding of the
standard story about Legal Realism—yet another generation with bloodlines
running to the male-only traditional account.93
88
Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies, supra note 37, at 673; see also James Boyle, Introduction: A Symposium of Critical Legal Studies, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 929, 929 (1985)
(“Recently there has been a great deal of loose talk and brouhaha about critical legal
studies. Several symposia have been devoted to the distinctly unplayful task of defining
this mysterious animal.”).
89
Carrie Menkel-Meadow has described how men at the CLS conferences “ghettoized” its women members by relegating them to separate sessions. Carrie MenkelMeadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal Education or “The
Fem-Crits Go to Law School”, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 61, 63 (1988) [hereinafter MenkelMeadow, The Fem-Crits Go to Law School] .
90
Similarly, faculty of color—women and men—reacted to the exclusionary practices of CLS scholars. Critical Race Theory is also said to have emerged largely as a
result of this rift. For a detailed account of the emergence of the Critical Race Theory
movement through this same history and the related call for Critical Race Realism as a
new school of thought, see Gregory Scott Parks, Toward Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 683, 704 (2008) (“Just as Realism was the precursor to the Law
and Society movement, itself a precursor to Critical Legal Studies, Critical Legal Studies
was a precursor to Critical Race Theory.”). For a discussion of how some women of
color were, and may continue to feel, torn between and erased by the feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory camps, see Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 152 (1989).
91
See D. KELLY WEISBERG, FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS xvii–xviii
(1993) (providing accounts of the birth of feminist legal theory that largely track the
traditional narrative—suggesting it is a reaction to a largely male past rather than a return
to, or acknowledgment of, earlier feminist realist practices).
92
Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617, 621–22
(1990). See generally Menkel-Meadow, The Fem-Crits Go to Law School, supra note 89.
93
See Menkel-Meadow, Taking Law and ____ Really Seriously, supra note 71, at
576 (“Feminism and Critical Race Theory continued in theory what Critical Legal Studies had begun—the critique of law as “neutral” or “objective.”); Ronald Chester & Scott
E. Alumbaugh, Functionalizing First-Year Legal Education: Toward a New Pedagogical
Jurisprudence, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 21, 44–45 (1991) (noting connections between the
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Like traditional realists, many of these critical lawyers and scholars
sought to reach outside of customary legal doctrine to bring other disciplines
to bear on their understanding of the law in action.94 But the legal scholars
and practitioners who moved in this direction—primarily women—did so
with a view toward challenging male-centered assumptions and tools of the
legal academy and legal institutions.95 In particular, they became more concerned with context, community, and action—much like Anna Moscowitz
Kross.96
Psychologist Carol Gilligan’s research featured prominently, serving as
a basis for feminist legal scholars to challenge the naturalized masculine
objective in the law and call for greater consideration of context, care, and
communion in legal discourse and decision-making.97 Similarly, early feminist legal scholars called for care and community-based approaches even
within the movement. Emblematic of this non-hierarchical ethos, Patricia
Cain called on women in law to “resist the privileging of one woman’s perspective over another,” or to allow the focus on individual theories concerning varied lived experiences to divide the group.98 These feminist legal
methods were seen as “radically nonassimilationist,” suggesting women in
law should be “resistant to [seeing] mere inclusion in dominant social institutions” as a mode of societal transformation.99 Thus, it appeared the group
was not only trying to practice what it preached, but lay groundwork at the

“Fem-Crits” and Legal Realism); see also Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements
of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 622 (1989).
94
See, e.g., Kathleen A. McDonald, Battered Wives, Religion, & Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 251 (1990) (religion); Martha Minow, The
Supreme Court, 1986 Term—Forward: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 46
(1987) (philosophy); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, Gender and Law: Feminist
Legal Theory’s Role in New Legal Realism, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 405, 405 (2005)
(“[F]eminism is at its core an interdisciplinary endeavor; feminist scholars are well accustomed to integrating work from multiple disciplines.”).
95
See Minow, Feminist Reason, supra note 62, at 47 (“Feminists have shown how
. . . assertions of neutrality hide from view the use of a male norm for measuring claims
of discrimination.”); Trubek, Lawyering for Poor People, supra note 73, at 985 (“Feminist scholars had suggested that the law excludes the concerns of women through its
incorporation of male perspectives and devaluation of personal experience.”).
96
See infra Part III.
97
See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA. L. REV.
803, 835–36 (1990); Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1,
14–15 (1988) [hereinafter West, Jurisprudence]; see also Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 211–12 (1989) (noting and questioning Gilligan’s insights). There were other approaches to feminist legal theory even at this early
juncture. The work of Catharine MacKinnon, seen as a dominance theorist or radical
feminist, offered related but alternative takes on patriarchy and the law. See CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED].
98
Cain, Feminism and Limits, supra note 97, at 846; see also Bender, A Lawyer’s
Primer, supra note 97, at 3.
99
Martha Albertson Fineman, Introduction to AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY, xiv Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen
eds., 1991) [hereinafter Fineman, Introduction].
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outset to stave off the reification of elite structures, power grabs, and divides
that damaged earlier critical legal movements.100
The ultimate goal was to substantively address women’s lived inequality, as well as to perpetuate fairness and non-subordination in the world
more generally.101 In this way, early Feminist Jurisprudence sought to
breathe new life into the circular debates that plagued CLS, stressing the
importance of a positive program with particularized values rather than
deconstruction for deconstruction’s sake.102 Although seen as largely
postmodern, early feminist legal thinkers were deeply concerned with pragmatism, life outside of the Ivory Tower, and action.
Significantly, even those engaged in “theoretical” work sought to look
beyond binaries and bridge the supposed divide between practice and
thought, ideas and activism.103 For instance, Martha Fineman called upon
her colleagues to reject the allure of “grand theorizing” so common in the
academic world, and to engage in “middle range” work that self-consciously
“mediates between the material circumstances of women’s lives and the
grand realizations that law is gendered.”104 Robin West advocated the value
of making visible the real life stories of women, to “dislodge legal theorists’
confidence that they speak for [women].”105 These activities were not intended to be limited to classroom discussions and professional conferences.
Leslie Bender, Mari Matsuda, and many others urged taking Legal Feminism’s work beyond the academy’s doors to “design transformative social,
political, and legal systems” that “emphasize feminist values and concerns”
and see humans as interdependent.106
Grounded insights of legal practitioners and clinicians were central to
the movement’s work in the early days. Ann Scales practiced law while
100
Cf. Scales, supra note 50, at 1401 n.144 (acknowledging some elitism within the
women’s legal movement, but noting it was not due to the “theoretical failure” of the
“revolutionary consciousness” coming from a “revolutionary elite” versus the masses
since most of its members—women—were the interested masses).
101
West, Jurisprudence, supra note 97, at 72 (“A perfect legal system will protect
against harms sustained by all forms of life . . . .”); Minow, Feminist Reason, supra note
62, at 47 (“Adopting . . . feminist critiques can deepen the meaning of equality under
law. I advocate developing similar feminist critiques in contexts beyond gender, such as
religion, ethnicity, race, handicap, sexual preference, socioeconomic class, and age.”).
102
See, e.g., WEISBERG, supra note 91, at 405 (“CLS seeks to deconstruct the law,
whereas feminist legal theory seeks to empower women through law”); Fineman, Introduction, supra note 99, at xi (“[T]he real distinction between feminist approaches to
theory (legal and otherwise) and the more traditional varieties of legal theory is a belief in
the desirability of the concrete.”).
103
Cf. WEISBERG, supra note 91, at 408 (noting that “[f]eminist writing has been
criticized for deemphasizing theory”).
104
Fineman, Introduction, supra note 99, at xii.
105
West, Jurisprudence, supra note 97, at 65.
106
Bender, supra note 97, at 11; see also Mari J. Matsuda, Liberal Jurisprudence and
Abstracted Visions of Human Nature: A Feminist Critique of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 16
N.M. L. REV. 613, 622 (1986) (discussing value of the collective efforts of feminists);
Cain, Feminism and Limits, supra note 97, at 806 (highlighting the need for a “womancentered perspective” as an important goal of feminist legal theory).
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teaching, including serving as lead counsel for New Mexico NARAL in a
case where it successfully sued for Medicaid funding of abortions.107 A
strong early voice in Feminist Jurisprudence, she urged her sisters in the
movement to resist abstraction and value “honesty and pragmatism”108 as
“[f]airness must have reference to real human predicaments.”109 Similarly,
Lucie White engaged students through feminist lawyering work. Focusing
primarily on the needs of poor women of color, White’s thinking and writing
was deeply informed by the personal interactions she had with women struggling in impoverished communities.110
These sentiments assisted feminist legal theory in being seen both as
critical and constructive.111 Legal Feminism was also hopeful. Energy pulsing through these early writings helped carry a message of optimism, suggesting that transformation and social change were possible through
collective action and new feminist approaches. Although none posited any
easy answers, the implicit message in this early scholarship was that by chipping away together over time, reformation of existing power dynamics and
structures of exclusion would be inevitable.
It was this optimism, in part, that led some feminists to recoil when
their work was characterized as a continuation of Legal Realism. For instance, Ann Scales expressed gratitude to the realists for beginning a conversation that challenged law as a “scientific enterprise, devoid of moral or
political content.”112 However, she dismissed the male-dominated movement as being insufficiently radical in its thinking and inadequately revolutionary in its efforts.113 More than this, Scales claimed Legal Realism failed
to deliver change as promised, instead leading followers down a dead-end
path.114 Patricia Cain noted that she resented comparisons between the traditional men of Realism and feminist legal scholars, as they implied that feminists lacked originality and failed to create something new.115
107
See UNIVERSITY OF DENVER, STURM COLLEGE OF LAW FACULTY DIRECTORY: ANN
C. SCALES, http://law.du.edu/index.php/profile/ann-scales (last visited Nov. 13, 2011).
108
Scales, supra note 50, at 1386.
109
Id. at 1380.
110
Cf. Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking “Welfare Dependency” from a Different
Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1970–71 (1993); see generally Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Hearing of Mrs. G., 38
BUFF. L. REV. 1 (1990) (analyzing Mrs. G.’s case).
111
See KALMAN, LEGAL LIBERALISM, supra note 25, at 179 (“Together, the legal
scholarship of feminists and critical race theorists was eclipsing that of their progenitor,
critical legal studies, in part because they seemed more constructive.”); Chester &
Alumbaugh, supra note 93, at 44–45 (“Groups such as the ‘Fem-Crits’ and their sympathizers exhibit more of the pragmatism of the Realists.”).
112
Scales, supra note 50, at 1400.
113
See id.
114
See id.
115
Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Legal Scholarship, 77 IOWA L. REV. 19, 32 (1991); cf.
Schlegel, Notes Toward an Intimate History, supra note 81, at 391 (“[T]he notion of
history implies a past that is to be recreated, and this organization effectively has no past
. . . .”).
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But these responses suggest that feminist scholars were overlooking another powerful avenue for activism: feminist legal history. Focused on the
traditional male-centered tale, they overlooked the possibility of a new narrative about the legal realists—a narrative that would include overlooked
voices, experiences, and desires of past women in law, in addition to focusing on the law in action. By accepting the standard story about Legal Realism, feminists implicitly bought into an androcentric account of that
movement and its lineage, with its focus on thinking over doing.116 Indeed,
despite these early protests, the naturalizing of this history and traditional
version of events has resulted in feminist legal scholars impliedly becoming
the intellectual daughters of the CLS movement, granddaughters of the Law
and Society movement, and great-grandchildren of the realists we know.117
Worse, however, seeming to replicate the practices of the realists, many
contemporary legal feminists have turned increasingly towards academic debates focusing on supremacy of ideas. Like earlier generations in the standard story, it appears contemporary feminist legal projects in this country
have largely become battles over words, thoughts, and theories rather than
active struggles to improve lived experiences. Sadly, the Feminist Jurisprudence movement may be falling prey to seeming inevitability and adopting
the same destructive patterns that impaired successes of earlier critical generations.118 Somewhat paradoxically, they may be abdicating claims of radicalism and creativity in the process, ensuring their own movement fails to
deliver change.119
For example, despite early assertions that feminist legal work was primarily concerned with concrete and experience-based issues, it veered in the
direction of the “malestream” theorizing it purported to reject.120 As the
movement unfolded throughout the 1990s and into the new millennium,
feminist legal conversations grew increasingly abstract and removed from

116
Cf. Martha Minow, Feminist Reason, supra note 62, at 52 (“[W]e share the version of reality that has for the most part prevailed in the entire culture. Not only does this
instill conceptions of difference and stereotypic thinking, it also gives us internal scripts
about how to argue, and indeed, how to know.”).
117
Feminist historian and activist Gerder Lerner has warned about a related problem.
By accepting traditional, male-centric histories some women tend to embrace their place
as victims and internalize “the myth of their inferiority, [and] their passivity.” GERDA
LERNER, LIVING WITH HISTORY/MAKING SOCIAL CHANGE 165 (2009).
118
Id. (arguing that the impression women were not a part of key historical moments
may impact the ability of contemporary women to “think creatively and strive for
originality”).
119
See NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
SOCIAL THEORY 169–70 (1998) (warning that feminists’ failure to more directly engage
traditional jurisprudence out of fear of buying into the orthodoxy may be shortsighted,
resulting in overgeneralizations and lost opportunities).
120
Cf. Liz Stanley & Sue Wise, But the Empress Has No Clothes! Some Awkward
Questions About the ‘Missing Revolution’ in Feminist Theory, 1 FEM. THEORY 261, 263
(2000).
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the lives of individual women and other marginalized persons.121 Having
arrived, many legal feminists appeared to climb ever-higher into the Ivory
Tower to engage in heady conversations largely inaccessible to the vast majority of persons supposedly embraced by the feminist agenda.122 Even when
fully understood, the weight of these discourses has provided little forward
movement. And feminist legal work, frequently drawing from the dense
work of Judith Butler, has become decidedly less encouraging.123 Newer
legal feminists have also turned ever away from the reality of lived
experiences.
An example of such a conversation took place at a 2003 symposium
hosted by the Columbia Journal of Gender and Law. A group of feminist
scholars, when asked to respond to the question: “Why a Feminist Law Journal,” decided to use the 1994 Texas Supreme Court Case Twyman v.
Twyman,124 a case “involving divorce, sadomasochistic sex, and a claim of
emotional distress, as a focal point to explore how feminism deals with gender, sexuality, and power, and whether it does so sufficiently.”125 Many of
the participants, including Janet Halley and Brenda Cossman, offered some
form of their own “re-readings of the Twyman facts,” which involved William and Sheila Twyman, their divorce, and related legal proceedings for tort
damages.126 Such re-readings were intended, in part, as a way to “take a
break” from old-school legal feminism’s confining constructs, which too
often depict women in a singular, vulnerable light.127
As a result, Sheila Twyman’s own factual allegations, including claims
of coercive sado-masochist sex by her husband—who knew “she had been
121
See Brenda Cossman, Dan Danielsen, Janet Halley & Tracy Higgins, Gender, Sexuality, and Power: Is Feminist Theory Enough?, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 601, 610
(2003) (noting that “[o]ne of the most crucial moments in the genealogy of United States
feminism was the roughly simultaneous publication in 1990 of Judith Butler’s Gender
Trouble and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s Epistemology of the Closet”).
122
See LACEY, supra note 119, at 176–78 (describing undue abstraction as one negative consequence stemming from grand theorizing); Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 277, 297–98 (2008) (“Newer
feminisms have also placed a much greater emphasis than older feminists on the role of
complex ideologies in producing gender injustice . . . [and use] a style that is much less
familiar, direct, or accessible to legal scholars.”); cf. Naveen Thayyil, Feminist Jurisprudence and Navel Gazings: Some Reflections, 14 UCL JURISPRUDENCE REV. 308, 324
(2008), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=81269 (“Feminist jurisprudence at
present, it would appear, needs larger audiences and more participants, more listeners and
more sections to discuss, to debate, and to disagree.”).
123
Dixon, supra note 122, at 300, 302 (“Newer feminist theories are . . . consistently
more skeptical of the capacity of law to act as a vehicle for achieving feminist change.”
Postmodern feminists, for example, believe “feminist resistance should focus on
processes of literary and analytic deconstruction, rather than the kind of political mobilization aimed at achieving legal change.”).
124
855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
125
Cossman et al., supra note 121, at 601.
126
Id. at 611, 626.
127
Id. at 633; see also JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A
BREAK FROM FEMINISM 348–63 (2006) (offering an expanded view of the author’s
thoughts on such an enterprise, including an extended re-reading of the Twyman case).
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raped at knifepoint before their marriage”128—were purposely rewritten so
the authors could bring to bear Foucault, Nietzche, and “queer theory
postmodern feminism informed by the work of Judith Butler”129 on the
Twyman story.130 Under one constructed reading based on Foucault Volume
One, Sheila is the “anti-sex fidelity-enforcing wife from hell, who won’t
have mild S/M sex with her husband, won’t let him sleep around to let him
get it, and won’t divorce in peace.”131
No doubt overly simplistic, binary characterizations of women as victims and men as abusers are out of step with many modern understandings of
human relationships.132 And a critique of the Texas Supreme Court’s decision, as well as its development of a limited doctrinal vantage point, would
serve as appropriate feminist legal fodder.133 Even taking issue as a lawyer
with Sheila Twyman’s account or the validity of her legal claim seems appropriate. But expressly disregarding “what actually or probably happened between William and Sheila Twyman” for purposes of dramatically retelling
their story in “four very divergent” ways to showcase theory’s possibilities
seems to lack a productive goal, as well as a sense of respect.134 “Taking a
break” from feminism should not involve disregard for the experiences and
expressed pain of others. Yet, by the article’s end, it seems plaintiff Twyman
served as a puppet dressed in different deconstructive costumes. In an ulti128

Twyman, 855 S.W.2d at 620 n.1.
Cossman et al., supra note 121, at 621.
130
See id. at 614–17, 621–23.
131
Id. at 616. As a further example, the authors offered another take on the real
story: that the parties’ divorce action and struggles over William Twyman’s infidelity,
which had been pending for several years, “was for both of them a paroxysm of intimacy,
a sustained crescendo of erotic interrelatedness, which, if it should ever end, would leave
both of them aimless and lonely to the last degree.” Id. One is left to wonder if anyone
ever called Sheila Twyman to ask how she felt about such characterizations of her life.
132
See infra note 282 and accompanying text.
133
See generally Mae C. Quinn, Note, The Garden Path of Boyles v. Kerr and
Twyman v. Twyman: An Outrageous Response to Victims of Sexual Misconduct, 4 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 247 (1995) (examining Twyman’s implications and the viability of intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in cases involving alleged sexual misconduct
or abuse). Indeed, over fifteen years ago, when the Twyman case was first decided, I
wrote a student note examining its implications and the viability of intentional infliction
of emotional distress claims in cases involving alleged sexual misconduct or abuse. See
id. (arguing that plaintiffs in sexual misconduct cases will seldom be successful under the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress). Interestingly, nearly ten years after
my note was published, Brenda Cossman offered her first “rereading” of the facts of the
case to include a more sex-positive interpretive possibility. In doing so, she suggested
that my Note, described as the only comment on the case written at the time, merely
“proceed[ed] on the assumption that [the sexual activity in Twyman] constitutes an
emotional harm.” Brenda Cossman, Sexuality, Queer Theory, and “Feminism After”:
Reading and Rereading the Sexual Subject, 49 MCGILL L.J. 847, 860–61 n.53 (2004).
While admittedly my student note was underdeveloped in a number of respects, and my
thinking has changed since my law school days, I did not assert that sadomasochist sexual activity is per se harmful and unlawful. This was, and is, not my position at all.
Rather, my point was that juries, as a cross-section of the community, may be best-suited
for determining certain features of tort-based claims—not judges.
134
Cossman et al., supra note 121, at 611.
129
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mate rejection of the realist agenda, Sheila Twyman’s life story, and that of
William Twyman, became fiction.
Although this example, with its unabashed rejection of lived reality, is
extreme, over the last decade legal feminists around the world have voiced
concerns about similar developments. For instance, Joanne Conaghan, a
British feminist legal scholar, has expressed regret that many postmodern
colleagues, in attempting “to avoid the ‘trap’ of essentialism . . . simply . . .
steer clear of approaches which rely on or invoke some notion of women’s
experience.”135 This, she laments, has “the unfortunate effect of directing
feminist efforts away from concrete, empirically-based legal research with a
socio-economic or distributive focus towards more abstract theoretical encounters with gendered cultural and legal representations.”136 Similar concerns have been expressed in this country.137
Somewhat ironically, however, some of the most vocal critics of contemporary feminism’s abstractions have engaged in a fair amount of theorizing on their own.138 In addition, many have adopted the same sharp sound
of their American realist forefathers.
For instance, Katherine Sheehan rebuffed Robin West for her lack of
care and hostility against postmodernism when she stated, among other
things, that “for feminist reformers concerned with doing something with
law to end patriarchy, as a tool of analysis deconstruction has all the usefulness of an unhinged steering wheel in avoiding a collision with a wall.”139
Sheehan then belittled West’s analysis, declaring: “West is wrong about
deconstruction, but she is wrong in an interesting way, and it is interesting

135
Joanne Conaghan, Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J.L. &
SOC’Y 351, 369 (2000).
136
Id. at 370.
137
One of the most notable examples was Martha Nussbaum’s New Republic essay
decrying the influence of Judith Butler’s work. See Martha Nussbaum, The Professor of
Parody: The Hip Defeatism of Judith Butler, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1999, available at http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf.
138
See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 97; but see id. at
198–205 (discussing collaboration in the context of anti-pornography legislation drafted
by MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin). Such irony is not our prize alone. In a recent
exchange between Australian feminist legal scholar Ngaire Naffine and Britain’s Anne
Bottomley, both expressed concerns about theory overtaking more grounded work; each
one, however, accused the other of engaging in undue abstraction. See Ngaire Naffine, In
Praise of Legal Feminism, 22 LEGAL STUD. 71, 71 (2004) (reflecting on the achievements
and ongoing challenges of feminism within the academy); Anne Bottomley, Shock to
Thought: An Encounter (of a third kind) with Legal Feminism, 12 FEM. L. STUD. 29,
42–44 (2004) (accusing Naffine of joining an “orthodoxy” in feminist legal scholarship
that panders to the legal academy, while deconstructing Naffine’s text through reference
to French philosopher Alain Badiou); see also Ngaire Naffine, Shocking Thoughts: A
Reply to Anne Bottomley, 12 FEM. L. STUD. 175, 177 (2004) (responding to Bottomley,
by pointing out the hypocrisy of her critique since her writing is “designed for a very
select and knowing audience”).
139
Katherine C. Sheehan, Caring for Deconstruction, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 85,
85 (2000) (responding to ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997)). Sheehan begins her
article noting that West’s statement reflected an “uncharacteristic lack of grace.” Id.
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that she goes so far out of her way to be wrong about deconstruction.”140
Similarly, Catharine MacKinnon shared her own critical views about
postmodern feminist legal work, declaring that by “pretending to be
profound while being merely obscure (many are fooled), slathering subjects
with words, its self proclaimed practitioners fairly often don’t say much of
anything.”141
Just as was seen in earlier male-dominated critical legal efforts, a great
deal of feminist legal work has involved unkind wars of words.142 Many
adherents appear to be competing to have their academic ideas win out over
others—without sufficient concern for their peers or improving material circumstances in the world. Rather than continuing these debasing debates
about words as they appear on paper, which seem to have us stuck in the
present, perhaps we should revisit our past to see if there is a way forward.
II. THE FORGOTTEN CHAPTERS
ANNA MOSCOWITZ KROSS

AND
AND

EMERGING COUNTER-ACCOUNT:
FEMINIST LEGAL REALISM

Given the current climate in feminist legal communities—as well as the
renewed interest in the American legal realist narrative—this is a particularly good moment to pause to reconsider the genealogy of Legal Feminism
as it relates to Legal Realism.143 Contrary to the claims of those who have
been telling (and accepting) the traditional male-only tale about Legal Realism, many women in law were, in fact, engaged in their own realist projects
during the first half of the last century. However, their work involved sites
of Legal Realism outside of appellate judging and decision-making, or legislative rules. On the ground in impacted communities and trial courts, these
women engaged in legal work in various realistic ways. Often looking beyond formal legal mechanisms and rules, their pragmatic approaches to law
involved actively “doing” and “creating” Realism, and not just talking
about or “searching” for an American jurisprudence.144
Similar to male realists of the day, these women were concerned with
how people in individual communities, including themselves, were impacted
140
Id. Sheehan sarcastically adds that Martha Nussbaum’s apparently flawed analysis of Judith Butler’s work displayed a lack of care atypical of someone of her academic
standing and title. See id. at 87 n.14 (“Surely Nussbaum would not have become Ernst
Freund Professor of Law & Ethics at The University of Chicago if this effort were typical
of her scholarship.”).
141
Catharine MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 687,
693 (2000).
142
Cf. Mary Anne Case, Journals as a Feminist Playground, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 644, 647 (2003) (claiming feminist scholars need not “incorporate strategies in . . .
hurtfulness” as part of their projects, but would be wise “to learn not to be hurt as easily,
not to be as fearful of hurting others”); JUDITH A. BAER, OUR LIVES BEFORE THE LAW:
CONSTRUCTING A FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE ix (1999) (“I believe that the worst mistake
feminists have made is to be too nice.”).
143
See supra Part I; infra Part II.
144
See generally HULL, supra note 10 (searching for an American jurisprudence).
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by official decisions and institutions. Despite their exclusion from elite legal
venues, they came together to productively engage in social reform work in
innovative ways—to uplift themselves and others oppressed by marginalization. Like the traditional well-known realists, they were interested in interdisciplinarity. But frequently looking to non-legal and social-scientific
modes of operating to advance their causes, these women operationalized
such cross-cutting efforts.
Although there are parallels between the work of the women during this
time and that of the male realists, there were also significant differences. In
particular, as will be further explored, much of their work reflected different
values, goals and methods. These differences were not necessarily
gendered—that is to say, “female”—ways of operating. Nor is it clear these
practices were employed by women alone. But they do align with much of
what was identified at the outset of the Feminist Jurisprudence movement,
focusing on empowering marginalized persons, including women, through
law. And, unlike the known male realists, these women were focused on
delivering pragmatic responses. Thus, these similarities and differences
serve to recast Legal Realism’s past and may help to rethink Legal Feminism’s future.
One woman engaged in this more feminist realist enterprise was Anna
Moscowitz Kross.145 An early woman graduate of New York University
Law School, among the first women to actively practice law in the United
States, and one of the country’s first women appointed to the bench, Kross
was a trailblazer in establishing a place for women in the field of law. More
than this, however, she sought to impact institutions, represent clients, and
engage in judicial decision-making in ways that were seen as far from commonplace. Kross’s engagement with the law—a relationship that spanned
from the 1910s to the 1960s—was very much in line with realist aims, including using law as a means for social ends. However, her feminist approaches to such work suggests a somewhat different take on the realist
enterprise, one that I call Feminist Legal Realism.
A. Roots of Reform—In the Trenches
Anna Kross was born in 1892 in Nishwez, Russia, and her family came
to the United States to escape oppressive conditions when she was an infant.146 Settling in the Lower East Side of Manhattan, they shared a small
tenement apartment in a busy building filled with other poor immigrants.147

145

For the sake of clarity I refer throughout the text to “Kross” by her married name.
Mae C. Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s Critique of New York City’s
Women’s Court: The Continued Problem of Solving the ‘Problem’ of Prostitution with
Specialized Criminal Courts, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 665, 669 nn.10–11 (2006) [hereinafter Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique].
147
Id.
146
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Kross’s father worked in a garment factory.148 But day-to-day existence was
a challenge; the family constantly felt the sting and exclusionary power of
poverty.149 Kross later recounted for the press one particularly painful and
sad irony of her circumstances: that she was unable to attend her elementary
school graduation because her father, who made clothes for others, could not
afford to buy her the proper outfit to wear to the ceremony to receive her
diploma.150
While only a child, Kross also joined the workforce as a garment
worker.151 It is clear that though this experience was a prominent feature in
her life, shaping her thinking throughout adulthood, she did not let the factory walls limit her possibilities. Kross carried the skills she learned as a
nimble pieceworker into the larger world, putting them to practical use in
other ways.152 Responding to needs and opportunities as they arose, she supplemented the family’s earnings though odd jobs, including stringing beads
and tutoring other new immigrants.153
Education was always an important feature of Kross’s life. Realizing
her academic skills and talents, she made sure to put her schooling to good
service—not only focusing on her own advancement, but also on the betterment of those around her. Education was not something to be used to distance and exclude, but to bridge and facilitate. Kross’s generosity and
patience as a teacher took her outside of her tenement building and into the
larger New York City immigrant community. Ultimately, she taught at the
University Settlement and Education Alliance programs in lower Manhattan,154 where she worked with Russian Jews who sought to escape the
revolution and harsh conditions in their homeland, just as her family had.155
Many of her students endured continued mistreatment, harsh conditions, and discrimination in America.156 Kross understood this false promise.
148

Id.
See id.
150
See id.
151
Id.
152
Cf. Lucie White, Paradox, Piece-Work and Patience, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 853
(1992) (explaining how daily routines can affect lawyers’ perspective of the world).
153
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 669 n.11.
154
Id.; see also MINA CARSON, SETTLEMENT FOLK: SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE AMERICAN SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT, 1885–1930, ix (1990) (recounting the history of Settlement work in this country, including its emphasis on testing ideas through experience
over “hollow” thought experiments).
155
See CARSON, supra note 154, at 152 (explaining that after 1900, New York City’s
University Settlement became a center of assistance for “exiles and pogrom victims”
from Russia); RUTH HUTCHINSON CROCKER, SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE
SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT IN TWO INDUSTRIAL CITIES, 1889–1930, at 2 (1992) (noting that
most Settlement workers—unlike Kross—left lives of privilege to live among the poor
and help them).
156
See HOWARD MARKEL, QUARANTINE! EAST EUROPEAN JEWISH IMMIGRANTS AND
THE NEW YORK CITY EPIDEMICS OF 1892, at 32–37 (1997) (describing the difficult living
conditions of many poor Russian immigrants on Manhattan’s Lower East Side, including
overcrowding in tenement buildings and boarding houses); see also NANCY FONER, FROM
ELLIS ISLAND TO JFK: NEW YORK’S TWO GREAT WAVES OF IMMIGRATION 190–96 (2000)
149
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For instance, in her youth, she had been fired from a job because she could
not work on the Jewish Sabbath.157 And while holding a Sukkot ceremony in
their home, Kross’s family was accosted by someone throwing a bottle
through their window.158 These early experiences with poverty, subjugation,
and antisemitism led Kross to seek out a life in law.159 She received a scholarship to attend New York University Law School in 1908.160 However, she
continued to teach immigrants in the evening—always keeping one foot in
the real world and staying connected to lived experiences beyond bookbased learning.161
One of only a few women students at New York University Law
School, Kross formed a student Suffrage Association chapter, successfully
involving law school classmate Fiorello LaGuardia.162 Kross also brought
women law students and community members together around the issue of
prostitution and the treatment of women accused of such crimes. During this
time, various social and religious groups were engaged in a powerful moral
reform agenda to stamp out the “social evil” of prostitution, in part through
increased undercover stings and prosecutions.163 More moderate groups
called for compassionate treatment for women sex workers who were seen
as fallen women in need of assistance and support.164 Ultimately, in an effort
to respond to both calls, a specialized Women’s Court within New York
City’s Magistrates Court system was created to handle such matters separately from other criminal cases.165
Not yet able to provide direct representation to clients, Kross helped
lead citizen investigations of the Women’s Court, which attempted, among
other things, to stop its voyeuristic practices that placed accused prostitutes
on display for the community as a form of entertainment in evening sessions.166 Through the Prison Committee of the Church of the Ascension, an
Episcopal organization, she also organized groups to provide social and
other services to discharged women prisoners as an early form of re-entry
work.167 Thus, while still a law student, Kross implemented innovative, in(describing educational challenges faced by Russian Jewish immigrants in the early
1900s).
157
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 669 n.11.
158
Id.
159
See id.
160
Id.
161
Id. at 669 n.12.
162
Id. at 670.
163
Id. at 671–76.
164
See id.
165
See id.
166
See id. at 676–78.
167
Thus began a long working relationship between Kross and well-known, influential, and sometimes controversial Reverend Percy Stickney Grant of the Episcopal
Church of the Ascension. For more on the Church of the Ascension, see Parish History,
THE CHURCH OF THE ASCENSION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, http://www.ascensionnyc.
org/history (last visited Dec. 17, 2011). Grant, known as a socialist, brought together
religious, legal and other reformers to address class-based and other injustices. See gen-
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terdisciplinary approaches to impact legal institutions and develop holistic
models for the delivery of legal assistance beyond more binary conceptions
of the attorney-client relationship.
After she graduated in 1910 and passed the bar, Kross was finally in a
position to provide traditional representation within the Women’s Court.168
Here, too, she played a role in institutional reform outside of standard lawsuit-based mechanisms—along with her female peers in the profession.
Kross, one of the seventy-six members of the newly formed New York Women Lawyers’ Association (“Association”), helped press for provision of
counsel for accused prostitutes.169 Such women, if indigent and unable to
afford private attorneys, would not have otherwise obtained free representation. But Kross and the Association, through their perseverance and active
problem-solving skills, convinced judges and court administrators to appoint
volunteer women lawyers for many of the defendants.170 Kross was part of a
group of at least six women lawyers who formed an informal legal association to handle such matters.171
Interestingly, such efforts and generosity worked not only to protect the
rights of women defendants, but also to provide an opportunity for women
attorneys. Otherwise denied the ability to work,172 they were able to gain
practice experience and develop professional identities.173 Kross wrote about
erally PERCY STICKNEY GRANT, HOW TO PUT THE PEOPLE BEHIND THE LAW (1912)
(seeking to empower community members and have lawyers and lay people work together for social change).
168
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 678.
169
Id. This group was originally named the Women Lawyers’ Club and changed its
name to the Women Lawyers’ Association once it became more national in scope. See
Jean H. Norris, The Woman Lawyers’ Association, 4 WOMEN LAW. J. 28, 28 (1915) (noting that the Women Lawyers’ Association began as the Women Lawyers’ Club in 1899,
with only eighteen members); see also VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 235 (1998). Today it is known as the
National Association of Women Lawyers.
170
See Bertha Rembaugh, Problems of the New York Night Court for Women, 2 WOMEN LAW. J. 45, 45 (1912) (“During this month (April) we have had a good many conferences with the different magistrates and officials connected with the Court, urging them
in especial to assign us to first offender cases where there was no other attorney.”).
171
See Marion Weston Cottle, Women in the Legal Profession, 4 WOMEN LAW. J. 60,
60 (1915) (“Six lawyers—all members of the Women Lawyers’ Association—recently
volunteered to act as counsel for women prisoners in the New York Women’s Night
Court. The names of the women are Mrs. Jean H. Norris, Miss Bertha Rembaugh, Mrs.
Mary M. Lilly, Miss Anna Moscowitz, Miss Amy Wren, and Miss Sarah Stephenson,
who are numbered among the women leaders of the New York bar.”).
172
For instance, in a 1923 New York Times article, Kross recounted that law firms
refused to hire her when she graduated from law school because she was a woman. See
70,000 Work People Clients for Woman, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1923, at X7. In addition to
her Women’s Court volunteer work, she also volunteered in the office of an attorney
friend—a man—to gain experience handling labor union cases. Id.
173
See Mossman, supra note 172, at 19 (noting, in the context of the biography of
early Indian woman lawyer Cornelia Sorabji, “while ideas about gender and the culture
of legal professionalism could present formidable barriers to aspiring women lawyers,
these ideas sometimes intersected in paradoxical ways to offer new opportunities for women to become legal professionals.”).
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this phenomenon of interconnectedness in the Association’s newsletter, the
Women Lawyers’ Journal, which served as perhaps the main news outlet for
women lawyers across the country.174 Kross’s writing joined the articles of
other Association lawyers who supported each other in their various
projects—even when at times they might disagree about methods.175 The
Journal’s editors characterized the publication as “the link that binds us
together.”176
Using the Journal to recruit more women lawyers to practice in the
criminal setting, Kross described such work as a pragmatic solution to addressing unmet legal needs while gaining experience and exposure.177 More
than this, invoking language that could have easily informed the vocabulary
of later male realists, Kross extolled the virtues of women working in the
trenches while using legal processes to achieve substantive social ends beyond case resolution:
From the standpoint of social service it is the woman lawyer’s duty
to enter wholeheartedly into the criminal branch of the law . . . . Is
there any place where woman can be of greater service to her fellow man? Is there a better school of experience wherein she can
come closer to the actual facts of life? Very few women have
more than glimpsed behind the hideous portals of the criminal
court. The fear of contamination and a desire to avoid coming
face to face with certain phases of life seem to have a strong
hold upon even the woman in the legal profession. . . . [But]
[t]he time has come when it should be considered a privilege to
174
The Women Lawyers’ Journal was a quarterly newsletter published by the New
York Women Lawyer’s Club beginning in 1910. See DRACHMAN, supra note 169, at 235
(1998) (recounting that the Journal served as a platform for women lawyers and helped
the New York Association build its membership nationally from twenty in 1911, its first
year of publication, to 130 in 1914). Perhaps not surprisingly, the introductory notes of
the Journal, seeking further subscriptions from women lawyers across the country, suggested a similar symbiotic interconnectedness—“We extend a cordial invitation to all
women to join our Club and help our Journal. You need us and we need you.” See 1
WOMEN LAW. J. 17, 17 (1911).
175
For instance, Kross did not agree with all of Probation Officer Maude Miner’s
views on prostitution. See Anna Moscowitz Kross, Report on Prostitution and the Women’s Court (Part I – History of the Women’s Court) 3–5 (1935) (draft report from the
American Jewish Archives; copy on file with author) (noting Kross’s disagreement with
Miner about the establishment of the Women’s Court); see also Katherine B. Davis, Colony Plan Opposed, N.Y. EVENING POST, Dec. 11, 1916 (describing Miner’s early advocacy work to create the Women’s Court); Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note
146, at 674 n.35. But both Kross and Miner’s work was covered by the Journal. See
Women in Public Life, 3 WOMEN LAW. J. 31, 31 (1914).
176
To Members, 4 WOMEN LAW. J. 40, 40 (1915).
177
Anna Moscowitz, The Opportunity of the Women Lawyer in the Criminal Court, 4
WOMEN LAW. J. 86, 86 (1914) [hereinafter Moscowitz, Opportunity]. In fact one of
Kross’s colleagues in this endeavor, Jean H. Norris, went on to be named the first women
judge in New York’s Magistrates Court system. See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique,
supra note 146, at 681. Anna M. Kross was the second woman named to the position.
See infra Part III.B.
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have the opportunity of coming in close touch with our more unfortunate fellow beings . . . . The opportunity of coming before the
public, winning professional recognition and—above all—performing social service, should inspire women to enter the practice
of criminal law.178
Thus, in an apparent attempt to head off future claims of superiority by women in the profession who might turn away from “real life” interactions
with accused criminals, she strategically turned traditional hierarchical assumptions on their heads. It was a duty, as well as an honor, for legal professionals to engage those with legal and social needs. Moreover, this
personalized interaction served as a new mark of success in the profession.179
Kross, like many of the City’s vice crusaders, hoped to reduce prostitution in New York City. But through direct representation, she came to have
a deeper appreciation for this complicated issue than those driven by religious or moral compunction. Kross came to view prostitutes not as criminals,
but individuals whom society largely failed, and whose work, in turn, could
negatively impact society—making them a “social problem.”180 And while
in some ways she shared the paternalistic instincts of other vice crusaders,
she was more interested in helping empower women so that they could take
control of their own lives.
Working closely with sex workers, she also came to see them as unique
individuals with complex life stories that the legal system, with its “cold”
application of statutes, did not fully consider.181 Law’s punitive processes
were not sufficiently informed by emerging social-scientific methods to offer meaningful alternatives to incarceration.182 In addition, the law as written
and applied often resulted in unintended consequences. Many of Kross’s
clients were actually victims of the law, quickly accused and wrongly swept
178

Moscowitz, Opportunity, supra note 177, at 86.
Similar sentiments were expressed by Clara Foltz, an earlier woman criminal defense lawyer engaged in similar work on the west coast. See BARBARA BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF CLARA FOLTZ 288–319 (2011) (chapter crediting Foltz with
developing the role of the public defender in this country).
180
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 670 n.118. Anna Moscowitz sometimes vacillated between expressing her own moral concerns about prostitution and suggesting that others held such views. Her repeated use of conclusory, popular
terms of the day like “social evil” suggests that she was more judgmental of prostitutes
than she acknowledged. From her writings and work, it is clear she gave a great deal of
thought to the thorny issue of sex work and that her position on criminal prosecutions
intensified over time based on her experiences, leading her to call for abolition of the
Women’s Court. See infra Part III.B. In addition, such statements may have reflected
practical and strategic advocacy moves. See Michele Alexandre, The New Faces of Feminism, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 97, 100, 104 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (describing in part the
sometimes “shrewd strategic calculation” of “feminism-in-action” who work outside of
the academy).
181
See Anna Moscowitz, The Night Court for Women in New York City, 5 WOMEN
LAW. J. 9, 9 (1915) [hereinafter Moscowitz, The Night Court for Women].
182
See id.
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up in overzealous vice raids in poor communities.183 The rules of evidence,
as applied, resulted in innocent women being discredited and lying police
officers believed.184
These conclusions, grounded in lived reality, informed Kross’s thinking
beyond individual cases and inspired her to undertake more significant systemic reform efforts. While she continued to represent accused prostitutes in
the Court, she began publicly advocating modification of the institution’s
overly legalistic and punitive processes. Kross took up the cause in a 1915
Women’s Law Journal article, sharing insights about what she learned as a
Women’s Court lawyer and, now, Chairperson of the Legal Committee of the
Forum of the Church of the Ascension.185 Again using language remarkably
similar to that used years later within legal realist circles, Kross complained
about the formalistic nature of the Women’s Court:
[I]n the [Women’s] Night Court . . . [e]ach case must be brought
under some statute called by some legal name, and fall within
some section of the law, aided by legal interpretation. The accusation, the accused, the evidence, as well as the plea, are confined
within legal provision, and all parade in legal attire. This is the
result of the institution itself. It is purely and simply a court of
justice, governed by legal phraseology, technicality and
restrictions.186
Beyond the mechanistic processes, Kross complained that the personnel running the Court failed to account for the realities that unfolded before them:
The magistrate upon the bench, no matter what his feelings may be
or how kindly disposed he may feel toward an offender, is under
the law, only the modern incarnation of the Simon of Pharisee, the
Legalist of Old. Every officer in the court gradually but surely
absorbs this spirit. Even the woman probation officer takes on
magisterial function and is but another of the empty forms which
brings not hope, but punishment and despair to the offender.187
Accordingly, Kross called for a less formal and more social-scientific
approach to dealing with accused prostitutes. She explained in broad strokes
that any legal intervention should serve as a means to the social end of assisting those drawn to the sex trade:
Here is the crux of the evil of the [Women’s] Night Court. The
strictly legal procedure is more or less antagonistic to and in conflict with the healthy treatment of the social evil. The government
183

Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 680–81.
See id.
185
Moscowitz, The Night Court for Women, supra note 181, at 9.
186
Id.
187
Id. Here, Kross may have been referring to Maude Miner. See supra note 175.
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of any community in proceeding successfully against the social
evil, must have the sanction of the law as a matter of course, but
the treatment should be based on a knowledge of human nature
and human suffering, severe if necessary, but always sympathetic. . . . Here is a wide field of labor waiting for sympathetic
hearts and ready hands to help bring about a more scientific system in the treatment of the downcast and fallen . . . .188
Over the next few years, Kross pressed her public campaign to change
applied law and legal institutions around prostitution—continuing to build
alliances not only with those inside and outside of the legal profession, but
inside and outside of her faith.189 Further embracing her role as Chairperson
of the Legal Committee of the Church of the Ascension, Kross wrote to
Mayor John Purroy Mitchell in 1917 to complain about harsh vice police
practices and the Court’s failure to treat accused sex workers humanely.190
Although the Mayor did not completely dismantle the criminal court model
for prostitution cases, he did abolish the Women’s Court evening sessions.
Moving all matters to daytime sessions, he addressed the complaints of
Kross and her peers about accused women serving as a form of entertainment for evening theater-goers.191
In addition, in 1919, the Mayor appointed the first woman to the Magistrates Court bench, Jean H. Norris—one of the lawyers who had been working with Kross to provide representation to accused prostitutes and her
former New York University classmate.192 He hoped Norris would help to
“feminize” or humanize the court’s features.193 These modifications, while
they did not satisfy all of Kross’s requests, reflected the later realist insight
that law and its improvement did not necessarily implicate the written statutes, but was a function of the “the area of contact between judicial (or

188

Id.
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 679–81.
Id. at 681; see also ANNA M. KROSS, REPORT ON “PROSTITUTION AND THE WOMEN’S COURT” 10 (early draft) [hereinafter KROSS REPORT] (on file with author). Unfortunately, I have been unable to locate the final version of this famous report, which was
covered by the press at the time of its release. See Mrs. Kross Favors Social War on Vice,
N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 1935 (“The official report on a complete survey of the methods
used in [the Women’s Court] was sent to the Mayor early this week, after several months
investigation at the suggestion of the City Chief Magistrate.”). Only draft versions of the
report have been located, and they are on file at the American Jewish Archives of Hebrew
Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.
191
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 681. A sign was also
posted in the courtroom warning that “[n]o idlers or sightseers are permitted to attend.”
GEORGE E. WORTHINGTON & RUTH TOPPING, SPECIALIZED COURTS DEALING WITH SEX
DELINQUENCY 293–94 (1925).
192
Mrs. Jean H. Norris Appointed to Bench: First Woman Magistrate to be Named in
This State Nominated by Mayor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1919, at 4.
193
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 681–82 n.86 (reflecting
an understanding that women’s experiences at that point might bring to bear different
thinking than that of men on the bench).
189
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official) behavior and the behavior and impact on laymen.”194 Here, the
impact related to laywomen.
B. Progressive Progression—On to the Trial Court Benches
Problems continued in the Women’s Court, however, including a corruption scandal that resulted in Judge Norris being removed from office in
1931.195 Kross replaced Norris in 1934.196 On the bench only a week, Kross
spoke at a lunch for the New York City Federation of Women’s Clubs. There
she declared that as a judge she “was more than ever convinced that the only
hope of getting at the roots of the problem of prostitution was to take it out
of the courts, out of the category of crime, and ‘devise some system of handling it socially.’” 197
At the invitation of her former law school classmate, Fiorello LaGuardia, who took office as New York City’s next mayor the same day Kross
took the bench, Kross officially proposed an alternative model. Kross’s
plan—outlined in a lengthy 1935 report, which received a great deal of press
coverage—called for abolition of the entire Women’s Court model and the
creation of an alternative system to address prostitution as a public health
and social services issue.198 Kross characterized the existing Women’s Court
as being built upon a “naive faith in the omnipotence of the laws.”199 Expanding on her earlier ideas, Kross urged a new hybrid medical-social system of case resolution for prostitution matters outside of the formal court
structure.200
She envisioned a tribunal consisting of a medical doctor, psychiatrist,
and lawyer who would assist accused prostitutes to receive medical, social,
counseling and other services. It would operate like an administrative board,
as in the workers’ compensation system, and encourage voluntary compliance rather than rely on punitive measures like jail sentences to address sex
work. Beyond dealing with those engaged in the sex trade, the tribunal system would assist with public education and make treatment available for
anyone who might have contracted venereal disease.201 Thus, deeply inter194

Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 14, at 442–43.
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 683–85; see also JOHN
M. MURTAUGH & SARA HARRIS, CAST THE FIRST STONE 232 (1957) (describing an “extortion ring that operated among innocent women as well as professional prostitutes” in
the Women’s Court).
196
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 685. Mayor O’Brien
appointed Kross as one of his last official acts, the night before LaGuardia took office.
Id.
197
Mrs. Kross Scores Vice Case Methods, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1934, at 24; see also
Quinn, Revisiting Anna Moscowitz Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 685.
198
See KROSS REPORT, supra note 190.
199
Id. at 12; see also Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 686–87.
200
KROSS REPORT, supra note 190, at 3–4; see also Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 687–88.
201
KROSS REPORT, supra note 190, 3–4.
195
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disciplinary in its approaches and rooted in emerging social science methods, Kross’s proposal was a localized example of the kinds of administrative
models about which realists in the academy were writing and theorizing.202
Although the plan found support within the women’s bar and the medical community,203 Mayor LaGuardia rejected it.204 Kross publically criticized him for this, using her unique real-world vantage point and personal
narratives to support her critique. In a statement distributed at the Women’s
Court on June 6, 1936, which she read from the bench, Kross accused LaGuardia of wasting funds on costly and ineffective vice investigations rather
than setting up her proposed tribunal.205
She further described the plight of the women brought before her,
trapped in the City’s web of corruption.206 She recounted that after a recent
house raid, five prostitutes were arrested—four of whom had counsel; the
fifth did not because she “presumably had fallen behind in her weekly payments” to her pimp or the police.207 She also shared insights on how the
system’s punitive and legal focus failed to break the cycle of repeated arrests
and actually kept sex workers linked to the trade. Invoking the experience
of another young woman recently brought before the bench, Kross chided:
[she] had just completed two years in prison for prostitution and
had been rearrested three weeks after her release, for soliciting on
the streets. ‘What would you have done,’ she asked me, ‘if you
were just out of jail, broke, and no place to go to’? If we are going
to do something about prostitution in New York City, here is
202
See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Birth of a “Logical System”: Thurman Arnold and the
Making of Modern Administrative Law, 84 OR. L. REV. 69, 71 (2005) (describing Arnold’s realist insights and desire to develop “functional, flexible relationships between
courts and agencies” to help bring about practical solutions to problems presented by the
depression era’s economic landscape).
203
See, e.g., Harry J. Benjamin, Prostitution: In Some of its Medico-Psychological
Aspects and an Attempt at its Practical Solution, MED. REV. REVIEWS 3, 21 (1935) (lauding Kross’s recommendations).
204
Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates Courts of the City of New
York: Suggested Improvements, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 411, 443–49 (1938) [hereinafter Kross
& Grossman, Suggested Improvements]. LaGuardia’s rejection of the plan may have also
reflected the rift that then existed in the New York state Democratic party around the
development of an administrative state like the one emerging on the national level. See
Daniel R. Ernst, The Politics of Administrative Law: New York’s Anti-Bureaucracy Clause
and the O’Brien-Wagner Campaign of 1938, 27 L. & HIST. REV. 331, 335 (2009).
205
Kross’s statement was motivated by the conclusion of a long-term sting resulting
in the arrest of gangster Charles “Lucky” Luciano. Taking LaGuardia to task for spending money on such activities rather than her proposals, she stated:
Over a year ago I submitted to the Mayor, at his request, a plan for a new procedure for handling the question of prostitution in New York City. . . . The Mayor
appointed a committee to consider this plan and other plans which were suggested. It has submitted no report, approved or disapproved no plan. We have
merely drifted along into a new vice-investigation.
MAGISTRATE KROSS, STATEMENT GIVEN OUT AT THE WOMEN’S COURT, 3–4 (1936).
206
See id.
207
Id.
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where we must do it: We must help to rehabilitate to readjust the
woman who has become a prostitute.208
Kross’s statements did not convince LaGuardia to adopt her plan, and
their relationship became strained following these interactions.209 But this
did not deter her from using her judicial position to re-imagine the legal
system’s treatment of sex workers, particularly younger prostitutes. Thus,
like other women reformers of her time who learned to be “both politically
visionary and practical,”210 Kross turned her attention to the administrative
workings of the court.211 There she found spaces between the cracks of law
to develop a new approach to try to empower the young women who came
before her.212 In this way, Kross was again “doing” the work of Realism,
rather than merely talking about it, operationalizing her theories on law, society, and crime.
C. The Wayward Minors’ Court and Social Services Bureau
Obtaining funds from the Federal Works Progress Administration in
1936 (“WPA”) and approval from the Magistrates Court Chief Judge, Kross
undertook an “experiment” within the Women’s Court that in some ways
mirrored her proposal to LaGuardia.213 With the help of social worker Dorris
Clarke, she established a specialized court docket called the Wayward Minors’ Court for Girls.214 It focused on young women between the ages of
sixteen and twenty-one charged with prostitution and other acts of sexual

208

Id.
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 690 (describing Kross’s
frustration with LaGuardia’s failure to adopt her plan); see also CHARLES GARRETT, THE
LAGUARDIA YEARS, MACHINE AND REFORM POLITICS IN NEW YORK CITY 16 (1961)
(describing tensions between Kross and LaGuardia); Gambler Decision Upheld by Court,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1943, at 15 (discussing LaGuardia’s criticism of Kross after she
dismissed charges against an alleged gambler).
210
Elisabeth Israels Perry, Critical Journey: From Belle Moskowitz to Women’s History, in THE CHALLENGE OF FEMINIST BIOGRAPHY 79, 90 (Sarah Alpern et al. eds., 1992)
(referring to Belle Moskowitz and the woman’s movement in general). Other women
during this time who sought to engage in legal reform understood Kross’s mode of operating. Id.
211
See id.
212
See generally Mae C. Quinn, The Modern Problem-Solving Court Movement:
Domination of Discourse and Untold Stories of Criminal Justice Reform, 31 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 57, 70 (2009) [hereinafter Quinn, Untold Stories] (offering one of the first
historic accounts of Kross’s establishment of the Wayward Minors’ Court).
213
See ANNA M. KROSS, NEW YORK (CITY) MAGISTRATES COURTS PROCEDURES FOR
DEALING WITH WAYWARD MINORS (1936) [hereinafter KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS];
Kross & Grossman, supra note 204, at 439–41 (recounting that the Chief Judge signed an
Order on March 2, 1936, authorizing creation of the Wayward Minors’ Court).
214
See Quinn, Untold Stories, supra note 212, at 74 n.82; see also DORRIS CLARKE,
THE WAYWARD MINORS’ COURT: 1936–1941: AN EVALUATIVE REVIEW OF PROCEDURES
AND RESULTS 6 (1941) (describing the Wayward Minors’ Court).
209
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“misconduct.”215 Seen as adults in the eyes of the law,216 these cases involving young women who ordinarily would have been handled like those of
other adult defendants.217 However, with the name of the new specialized
venue, Kross informally reframed them as youths in need of assistance. She
thus hoped to divert them from the criminal justice system and assist them
with counseling and social scientific interventions.218
She found other ways of being creative with the law, too, defining it
broadly like Llewellyn. For instance, she began hearing the cases of young
prostitutes in a different location from the regular adult defendants to try to
keep them from their corrupting influences.219 In addition, she employed
less formal court administration processes to create diversionary practices
short of trial on the merits.220 In these ways, the Wayward Minors’ Court
attempted to “minimize the strictly legalistic character of the court” and use
“individualized and socialized techniques and procedures”221 to help young
women despite their arrests.222
During initial presentments in the adult Women’s Court, the magistrates
screened cases for probable cause and sufficient proof.223 When there was
not enough evidence, the matters were immediately dismissed.224 However,
in Kross’s new Wayward Minors’ Part, the initial appearance was largely
used to gather background information on the accused and her needs, and
offer informal treatment and intervention if deemed appropriate.225 Kross
convinced many of these young women it was in their interest to accept the
assistance of the court to avoid formal prosecution and begin making life
changes.226 In doing so, defendants frequently “consented” to placement
outside of their homes for purposes of further social, physical, and mental
215

KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 1; BERNARD C. FISHER, JUSTICE
YOUTH: THE COURTS FOR WAYWARD YOUTH IN NEW YORK CITY 21 (1955) [hereinafter FISHER, JUSTICE FOR YOUTH] (stating that the court was “concerned chiefly with the
sexually promiscuous girl, the runaway, the undisciplined, defiant youngster, the neglected girl”); see also Wayward Minors’ Act, N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW Title VII-A § 913a (repealed) (available at NYU Law Library).
216
WALTER GELLHORN, CHILDREN AND FAMILIES IN THE COURTS OF NEW YORK CITY
149 (1954) (noting that in New York “a ‘child’ ceases being a child upon his sixteenth
birthday”); ALFRED J. KAHN, A COURT FOR CHILDREN: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK
CITY CHILDREN’S COURT 30–35 (1953).
217
See Quinn, Untold Stories, supra note 212, at 80.
218
Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 204, at 437; id. at 430
(“[T]he Wayward Minors’ part . . . seek[s] a scientific differentiation of treatment for
the persons who appear therein, on a sound crime prevention theory.”).
219
Id. at 173–74; CLARKE, supra note 214, at 6; see also Quinn, Untold Stories,
supra note 212, at 6.
220
Kross & Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 204, at 440–41.
221
CLARKE, supra note 214, at 17.
222
Id. at 10 (“From its inception, this court has aimed to ADJUST rather than to
adjudicate; and commitment is resorted to only after all other expedients have been
tried.”).
223
Id. at 12–13.
224
KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 5–6.
225
See id.
226
See CLARKE, supra note 214, at 14–15.
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examination.227 Kross wanted to take cases off the formal adjudication and
trial track, and reroute them towards therapeutic interventions based on the
unique needs and problems of each accused.228
Learning that the Probation Department was unable to take on additional intake and social work responsibilities to facilitate this new model,229
Kross again looked beyond the letter of the law.230 She created a team of lay
investigators and counselors—called the Magistrates Court Social Services
Bureau—to help with the court’s new functions.231 These volunteers were
called upon to gather mitigating, psycho-social, and other background information about the accused.232 Kross then used this information to develop
individualized treatment plans that remained in place during further adjournments for purposes of informal supervision.233 With the approval of their
Probation Officer, defendants who successfully fulfilled their plans of service were rewarded with a case dismissal.234 Those defendants who did not
were brought to trial, adjudicated, and formally sentenced.235 Other women
criminal justice reformers, such as Massachusetts’s Framingham Prison Superintendent Miriam Van Waters, similarly deployed women volunteers in
their innovative efforts during this period.236
Kross brought together a wide range of individuals and interests to address what she saw as a pressing social need. She tapped officials from nonprofit organizations, wealthy benefactors, public school teachers, and clergy

227
KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 14–18 (discussing “implied consent” obtained by “moral suasion”). The women were placed at residential facilities like
the Florence Crittenton League or the House of Good Shepherd. Quinn, Untold Stories,
supra note 212, at 73.
228
See KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 6.
229
See id. at 5–6, 10 (noting that intake staff completed extensive background
screens for defendants relating to their education, religion, living conditions, and medical
and mental health history); see also Mae C. Quinn, “Feminizing” Courts: Lay Volunteers
and the Integration of Social Work in Progressive Reform, in FEMINIST LEGAL HISTORY:
ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND LAW, supra note 61, at 208 [hereinafter Quinn, Feminizing
Courts] (describing that, because of a lack of resources, court probation staff could not
supervise most defendants).
230
See generally Quinn, Feminizing Courts, supra note 229, at 206 (recounting
Kross’s efforts to engage in judicial innovation through extra-legal experimentation).
231
For more on the various features and work of this group, see id. at 207–14.
232
KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 9–13. Kross explained that previously “special emphasis was laid on the immediate charges” and “[l]ittle effort was
made to unearth facts which might indicate the seeming delinquency was motivated by
unfortunate or undesirable factors extraneous to the immediate complaint.” Id. at 14.
233
Id.; see also CLARKE, supra note 214, at 13 (noting that this investigation between
arraignment and first appearance was “a radical departure from the ordinary adult court
routine” and that questions were raised “as to its legality”).
234
KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 17. In 1940, 330 defendants
passed through the Wayward Minors’ Court. CLARKE, supra note 214, at 51.
235
KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 18–19.
236
See, e.g., ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, MATERNAL JUSTICE: MIRIAM VAN WATERS AND
THE FEMALE REFORM TRADITION 188 (1996) (“The institution she created at Framingham
served as a magnet for local women’s volunteerism, supplementing national efforts to
relieve social problems.”).
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to give time and support to the Social Services Bureau.237 In the end, one
such religious official—Reverend Robert W. Searle, the General Secretary
of the Greater New York Federation of Churches—became President of the
Bureau’s Board, serving in that role for many years and facilitating Kross’s
interdisciplinary work on behalf of young women.238 During this still very
segregated era, Kross seemed somewhat concerned with diversity and respecting community, cultural, and racial differences. For, when her court
experiment for young sex workers was expanded to Harlem, she hired three
African American volunteer social workers to work with women defendants
there.239 Press accounts also mentioned that her Wayward Minors’ court volunteers came “from all religious and racial groups . . . thus instrumental in
providing opportunities for social and vocational adjustment.”240
D. The Home Term Court and Home Advisory Council
Over the years, Kross maintained her on-the-ground reform focus, expanded her experimentation, and turned her attention from one historic women’s issue, prostitution, to another: domestic violence.241 In 1946, she
established the Home Term Court—another specialized docket within the
Magistrates’ system—targeting non-felony domestic violence matters.242 In
this new court, Kross sought to use social-scientific interventions to ascertain the reasons for family conflict and head off future problems.243
The Magistrates Court Chief Judge at the time, Edgar Bromberger, was
highly supportive of Kross’s judicial experimentation.244 In describing Home
Term to the press, Bromberger used realist terminology, touting its rejection
of “legal ‘formalism,’” which did nothing more than aggravate family conflicts.245 Echoing Kross’s words from years before about reform of prostitution prosecutions, he asserted:
It has long been apparent to the magistrates . . . that a mere narrow, legal adjudication of the immediate marital episode causing
an arrest or the issuance of a summons in the Magistrates Courts
actually settles nothing of the fundamental family difficulty. On
the contrary, a hearing or trial in open court, with the couple testi237

Quinn, Feminizing Courts, supra note 229, at 210.
Id.; see also Robert Searle, Religious Leader: Head of Home Advisory and Service Council Dies, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1967, at 76.
239
Quinn, Feminizing Courts, supra note 229, at 210–11.
240
Welfare Bureau Will Meet at Tea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1936, at D6.
241
See generally Mae C. Quinn, Anna Moscowitz Kross and The Home Term Part: A
Second Look at the Nation’s First Criminal Domestic Violence Court, 41 AKRON L. REV.
733 (2009) [hereinafter Quinn, Home Term] (explaining how Kross treated domestic
violence prosecutions in a novel way and distinct from other criminal matters).
242
Id. at 742; New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 1946, at 23.
243
See New Marital Court Has Home Setting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1946, at 23.
244
See id.
245
New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 242, at 23.
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fying against each other—many times in the presence of neighbors—actually provides additional hazard to future family
tranquility and adds a further disturbing factor to the already muddled family condition.246
This thinking was informed by what Kross saw unfolding before her each
day on the bench. Despite repeated prosecutions and sentences, the same
domestic violence defendants seemed to return.247 Such recidivism led her to
believe there was often “more than met the eye and mind in the constant
repetition of tales of drunkenness, mistreatment and violence” that made
their way to the Magistrates Court.248
As World War II came to an end, the number of domestic violence
cases in New York City escalated to more than 10,000 a year.249 Hearing the
stories of families in her court, Kross concluded that many soldiers returning
home, some co-habitating with their spouses for the first time, were cracking
under the strain of economic hardship, housing problems, or other war-time
difficulties.250 Kross thus modified both the processes and physical features
of the Magistrates Court in part to attempt to address these problems and
model peaceful home life.
For instance, proceedings were not conducted in a formal courtroom
setting, but instead within a complex of rooms arranged to look like an
apartment maintained by a family of modest income.251 The space consisted
of a living room, dining room, kitchen and children’s nursery, all decorated
with donations from local businesses and benevolent organizations where
staff modeled certain practices within the home.252 Kross was especially
proud of the “cheery” red love seat in the court’s reception area where she
often sat with couples and talked with them in an effort to help them work
through disagreements.253
Once a complaint reached Home Term, the parties were summoned to
court and the case was assigned to intake staff. The staff questioned the
couple to learn as much as possible about the allegation and background
circumstances.254 As in the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross generally encouraged the parties to adjourn the case for purposes of an informal period

246

Id.
See Willella DeCampi & Mary Okon, Home Term Court Makes a Home, SUNDAY
DAILY NEWS, July 9, 1950, at 5.
248
Id.
249
New Courts to Sit in Home Disputes, supra note 242, at 23.
250
See Anna M. Kross, A Love Seat in Court 2 (Mar. 1, 1950) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter, Kross, A Love Seat].
251
DeCampi & Okon, supra note 247, at 4–5.
252
Id.
253
Kross, A Love Seat, supra note 250, at 2. She explained the couch “is symbolic
of our great aim. Two people must sit close together on it. This is exactly what we are
trying to do—to bring together those broken apart.” Id.
254
Quinn, Home Term, supra note 241, at 747–48.
247
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of supervision and services before formal resolution of the charges.255 Successful adjustment resulted in case closure without formal adjudication; failure to complete informal case work requirements led to the possibility of
incarceration.256 Commentators described this process as a “marked departure from legal formalism” that offered “a flexible, informal, and socialized
procedure with emphasis on the family’s general welfare rather than rigid
interpretation of the law.”257 And here again, such informality often involved a lack of formal legal representation for the accused batterer, causing
at least one set of commentators to suggest Kross’s Home Term established a
“new conception of the lawyer’s function.”258
Like many realists within the academy, throughout the 1940s Kross
continued to call for greater social-scientific methods in the application of
legal rules and assessment of legal processes. However, she also practiced
what she preached. She dedicated Home Term not only to resolving individual disputes of individual parties, but serving as a “laboratory” to study
family problems and improve court practices.259 Employing both medical
and psychological experts, she sought to develop more scientific practices.
She established an array of clinics to assist defendants and their families.
Kross created an Alcoholism Clinic to provide substance abuse treatment
services,260 and established an in-house Psychiatric Unit, run by a psychiatrist from Bellevue Hospital.261 Although such interventions might be relatively commonplace today with the advent of modern problem-solving
courts, in making use of interdisciplinary innovations involving law and sciences, Kross was clearly ahead of her time, including the male realists.262
Just as she had with the Wayward Minors’ Court, Kross developed a
private organization to assist her with the Home Term Court.263 This group,
called the Home Advisory Council, was also comprised of lay volunteers
and representatives from various religious and community groups.264 Unlike
the volunteers used in the Wayward Minors’ Court, however, most of these

255

Id.
Id.
257
ALICE W. FIELD & MAX BLAUSTEIN, HOME TERM: A SOCIALIZED COURT FOR
FAMILY PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK CITY MAGISTRATES COURT SYSTEM 6 (1948).
258
RICHARD MAISEL & JUNE CHRIST, FAMILIES IN CONFLICT: AN EXPLANATORY
STUDY OF THE PROBLEMS, THE PROGRAM AND THE NEEDS OF THE HOME TERM COURT
AND THE HOME ADVISORY COUNCIL 8 (1954).
259
See Quinn, Home Term, supra note 241, at 745 n.69.
260
Id. at 750.
261
Id.
262
This approach may be contrasted with the work of Walter Wheeler Cook and his
realist compatriots who left Columbia for Johns Hopkins University, where they established The Institute of Law. The Institute, in existence from 1928–1933, was largely seen
as a failed empirical experiment using questionnaires and data compilations to study such
things as divorce litigation and choice of forum for lawsuits. See JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE 147–210 (1995).
263
Id.
264
Quinn, Home Term, supra note 241, at 745–46.
256
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volunteers appeared to be from Kross’s own social and economic circle.265
Yet its volunteer counselors met with clients not only at court, but also in the
community—visiting their homes, talking to their family members, and
learning about their lives as lived.266 The counselors were intended to serve
as models for families, and also remained ready to help them outside of the
confines of the formal legal structures if needed.267
E. Scholarship, the Academy, and the Beginning of the Beyond
As noted, Kross shared her ideas through writing like the traditional
male realists. But her publications were not directed at a limited audience of
academic elites. Instead, her writing spoke to practitioners and others interested in the law’s operation on the ground. Kross used the Women Lawyers
Journal to reach a broader audience than her immediate circle.268 Her articles, contributing to a rich discourse about issues impacting women lawyers
and encouraging others to join her in social justice work, appeared in the
Journal from the 1910s through the 1960s.269
Once she took the bench, Kross published her work with more traditional academic presses.270 Perhaps most significant was her trilogy of articles published in the 1930s by the Brooklyn Law Review.271 Co-authoring
this series with Harold Grossman, Kross still maintained a much less lofty
tone than her male realist contemporaries. Instead, her work was deeply
engaged with procedural rules and how they unfolded in New York’s Magis-

265

Id. at 749.
Id. at 749–50.
267
Id. at 750. In addition to performing casework, Home Advisory Council members
were expected to develop and strengthen ties with community groups which could assist
families involved with the court. Id. at 746.
268
See 1 WOMEN LAW. J. 20 (1911); see also DRACHMAN, supra note 169, at 235
(“ The Women Lawyers’ Journal became the major vehicle for women lawyers to share a
range of concerns.”).
269
See, e.g., Moscowitz, Opportunity, supra note 177, at 86; Moscowitz, The Night
Court, supra note 181, at 9; Anna M. Kross, Conference on Juvenile Delinquency, 32
WOMEN LAW. J. 55 (1947); Anna M. Kross, Mental Health and the Courts, 50 WOMEN
LAW. J. 136 (1964); see also Anna M. Kross, Hypocrisy Scored in Penal Methods, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1937 at 99 (“But let the teachers and the social workers, the clergy and
the Y.M.C.A., the juvenile protective units and the penologists and the psychologists sit
down together and pool their views and their experiences and their facilities, and less
money will be spent and far more work accomplished.”).
270
See, e.g., Anna M. Kross, The Problems of the Family by Fowler V. Harper, 62
YALE L.J. 292, 311 (1953) (reviewing FOWLER V. HARPER & JEROME H. SKOLNICK,
PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY (1952)).
271
Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates Courts of the City of New
York: History and Organization, 7 BROOK. L. REV. 133 (1937) [hereinafter Kross &
Grossman, History and Organization]; Anna M. Kross & Harold M. Grossman, Magistrates Courts of the City of New York: Jurisdiction, Powers and Duties of Magistrates, 7
BROOK. L. REV. 295 (1938) [hereinafter Kross & Grossman, Powers and Duties]; Kross
& Grossman, Suggested Improvements, supra note 204
266
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trates Courts on a daily basis.272 Even after joining these more academic
conversations, she did not forget the power of the press outside of the Ivory
Tower’s walls and the importance of connecting with those she wished to
assist.
Throughout the 1930s and 1940s, Kross used New York Times coverage, as well as cultural events, to raise awareness of her work in the Wayward Minors’ Court.273 In a true show of interdisciplinary prowess, Kross
organized a theatre production whose proceeds benefited her innovative
court programs.274 After the Home Term Court was in operation for two
years, Kross also helped produce and disseminate a brochure—Home Term:
A Socialized Court for Family Problems in the New York City Magistrates
Court System—to describe the court’s day-to-day operations.275 Kross hoped
to share her developing expertise and provide a blueprint for other jurisdictions considering such a model.276
Kross’s work in the Magistrates Court continued until 1953, when she
was named Commissioner of New York City’s Department of Corrections.277
She held that position, using it to continue engaging in criminal justice innovations, until 1966278—when New York City’s Magistrates Court system was
entirely restructured and subsumed into a unified, state-wide court system.279
Her innovations in the Magistrates Court continued in her absence until the
Court’s closure.280 Replications of her court innovations currently abound—
generally without any attribution.281
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW NARRATIVE AND “DOING”
FEMINIST LEGAL REALISM IN THE FUTURE
This burgeoning alternative account of Legal Realism—which I have
termed Feminist Legal Realism—has many important implications for not
only reframing the history of Legal Realism, but also rethinking the future of
Feminist Jurisprudence work. These consequences may be best described by

272
See generally Kross & Grossman, History and Organization, supra note 271;
Kross & Grossman, Powers and Duties, supra note 271; Kross & Grossman, Suggested
Improvements, supra note 271.
273
See, e.g., Women Organized to Assist Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1935, at 41;
Welfare Bureau Will Meet at Tea, supra note 240, at D6; Welfare Project is Reorganized,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1940, at 31; Charity Will Gain by Theatre Party, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 1941, at 14.
274
See Quinn, Feminizing Courts, supra note 230, at 213.
275
FIELD & BLAUSTEIN, supra note 257.
276
See id.
277
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 693; see also Joan Cook,
Anna M. Kross Dies; An Ex-City Official, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1979, at D19.
278
Cook, supra note 277, at D19.
279
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 695.
280
Id.
281
See id. at 710; see also Quinn, Feminizing Courts, supra note 230, at 217; Quinn,
Untold Stories, supra note 212, at 69; Quinn, Home Term, supra note 241, at 757.
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noting at the outset what this new account does not do. This story is not
presented as blind reinforcement of legal history’s canon and all that canon
entails. I recognize there are dangers of reification by even repeating the
story I seek to challenge. But to offer a meaningful counter-account, some
context and traditional history would seem essential.
In addition, this telling is not intended to suggest that the work of Kross
and her cohorts, as compared to Llewellyn’s compatriots, should be seen as
inherently female or solely in gendered terms. Indeed, since men alone occupied the halls of the legal academy until well after the start of the traditional legal realist movement, women’s working space was outside of those
walls in the larger world. These differing boundaries and zones of influence,
at least in part, likely account for the different kinds of realist work each
group did—the traditional Ivory Tower realists’s work is mostly theoretical,
removed, and impersonal as compared to the contextualized and engaged
work of on the ground women realists. It is likely that many men outside of
the academy—excluded for reasons other than gender—were hard at work
applying Legal Realism’s thinking, too. Thus, Feminist Legal Realism as a
history should not be read as a counter-narrative focusing only on sex.
Rather, it provides new thinking about the different modes and means of
production operating within the movement, with activist methods serving as
an important focus of its own.
Finally, this new account is not intended to serve as an unqualified celebration of Kross’s work. Kross’s engagement with the law, spanning more
than fifty years, certainly is not above critique. But this is not a reason to
continue to ignore her groundbreaking efforts, which did contribute to a kind
of legal realist agenda.
So then, what does this developing feminist legal realist narrative affirmatively offer? Complete with tensions, inconsistencies, and less-thanflattering features, it holds itself out as a possible tool of transformation. It
may be used both as a way to challenge the past’s givens, including accepted
historic periodizations, and a means of rethinking contemporary legal feminism’s norms. It challenges givens by arguing that an important and potentially empowering vision of Legal Realism has been erroneously overlooked,
not only by the movement’s historians, but also by modern feminists who
have sought to distance themselves from what they have assumed to be a
male-only tale.
In addition, this account rethinks current feminist projects by suggesting that there is important work to be done in recovering and embracing
the unwritten feminist legal realist past. With such embrace we can, indeed,
take a break from the kinds of feminist activities that presently dominate the
legal academy—including jettisoning wars of words that are often unproductive or unkind. We would be better served by following Kross’s lead, working across disciplines to engage in greater activism to affirmatively impact
contemporary lived experience. This narrative further suggests that by “do-
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ing” Feminist Legal Realism, rather than merely thinking and talking about
feminism, we may begin to imagine a more productive future.282
Many pragmatically minded feminist historians, as well as feminist legal scholars, acknowledge limitations of focusing on “women” as a class.
However, they see it as a useful point of departure.283 Once a full enough
body of women’s history has amassed, we may not need to make such distinctions.284 But until then, we must continue to assemble the components of
women’s past to “make the larger patterns visible,” allowing us to move
towards a “new holistic history.”285 Women’s narratives can be used as a
way to enter larger conversations about injustice or inequity generally—not
just about women, sex, or gender.286 Characterized in this way, women’s historical narratives do more than merely document static past events and
groups. They become “doubly subversive”287 devices, telling us something
different about history while also serving “to destabilize the present.”288
Additionally, when we examine the actual details of women’s lives as lived,
rather than arms-length imagined or intentionally constructed concerns,
often we are able to see the kinds of authentic intersections and interconnectedness at work that we only aspire to articulate through theories.
The feminist legal realist narrative above, spotlighting Kross and her
cohorts, seeks to chart such a path. It suggests that the currently accepted
account of Legal Realism fails to credit the work done by many women in
law during its heyday. This new history does not purport to speak for all
women, or even all women in law. Instead, it recommends that further discussions of Legal Realism—particularly as they rethink and expand the
282
This shift in frame and focus is consistent with the calls of others to find a project
that would allow feminist legal scholars—old and new—to find connections. See Dixon,
supra note 122, at 307 (“New ways of connecting newer and older feminist theories are
. . . required.”); see also Cossman et al., supra note 121, at 608 (suggesting the possibility of “[t]aking a [b]reak” from modern legal feminism to, in part, enable feminists “to
see around the corners of its own construction”); see generally Martha Albertson
Fineman, Grappling With Equality: One Feminist Journey, in TRANSCENDING THE
BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 47 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Fineman, Grappling with Equality] (urging a
fundamental shift from gender-based, feminist equality discourse to more generalized and
generalizable concerns about vulnerability within the human condition, in part through a
reexamination of American legal history).
283
See LERNER, supra note 117, at 177; Fineman, Grappling with Equality, supra
note 282, at 60 (suggesting that “gender” can become the door through which one enters
the feminist legal discussion about equality, but it should not remain the entire focus of
the conversation); see generally Darren Hutchinson, Resistance in the Afterlife of Identity, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL
THEORY 176, 186, 189 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (warning about the dangers
of post-race/post-gender approaches).
284
Cf. Joan W. Scott, Feminism’s History, 16 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 10, 17 (2004)
(“[M]uch remains to be done in this unevenly developed field [of feminist history]
. . . .”).
285
Id.
286
See BENNETT, supra note 7, at 9.
287
Scott, supra note 284, at 18.
288
Id. at 21.
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traditional tale—must attend to experiences of women lawyers and others
like them who may be seen as contributing to its agenda in some way from
outside of the Ivy League and Ivory Tower. Indeed, whether one is to accept
Llewellyn’s own framing of the conversation, Fisher and Horowitz’s “big
tent” account, or even Tamanaha’s even broader and more nuanced conception of realist legal activity,289 it is clear that Kross and many other women
of her day were engaged in such efforts.
Beyond shaking the foundations of the movement’s accepted population, the feminist legal realist story also works to challenge many present
understandings of the project’s periodization. Kross began her realist activities well before the commonly understood start of the realist age. When this
chapter is added to the related recovered women’s histories offered by Felice
Batlan and others,290 a pattern emerges that fundamentally reframes the birth
of realist legal work. Moreover, pushing her innovative, interdisciplinary
legal projects forward for over fifty years, Kross’s account contests the nowaccepted end of that era. Indeed, as Kross’s own specialized criminal court
projects continue to find replication in today’s problem-solving courts,291 it
could be argued that the feminist legal realist era has never ended.
With Kross as a central character, this account also helps to bring home
the utility, as well as challenge the unitariness of categories like “woman.”
By the end of her career, Kross may have been seen as an “insider,” given
the positions she held as judge and then Commissioner of the City’s Department of Corrections.292 But it is important to remember that she did not start
out from a place of power or privilege.293 Even operating as an insider
within governmental institutions, she was not part of the legal academy’s
elite; seeing her only in light of the roles she held at the end of her life fails
to account for her whole person and experiences. As a poor Russian immigrant who endured discrimination and harsh treatment, Kross serves as an
example of a complicated identity reflecting many strands that cannot be
described monochromatically.294 Moreover, her position as a woman contributed to her life chances, choices, and decisions in a particular way, setting the scene for her approach to law, lawyering and judging. Simply
telling her story helps give life to identity’s complexity. Kross serves as an
important model for the multiplicity of most accounts.
289

See supra Part II.A.
See supra note 61.
See Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 710; see also Quinn,
Feminizing Courts, supra note 229, at 217; Quinn, Untold Stories, supra note 212, at 69;
Quinn, Home Term, supra note 241, at 757.
292
See supra Part III.C.
293
See supra Part III.A.
294
As a further part of this complicated identity, and as will be further examined in
my biography of Kross, while married to a man and the mother two children, her lifestyle
and life choices with varied friendships and interests do not fit neatly within heteronormative and maternal frames of the day. See MAE C. QUINN, ANNA MOSCOWITZ
KROSS: MOTHER OF SOCIO-LEGAL MOVEMENTS (forthcoming).
290
291
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One might question, then, why we should adopt the term “Legal Realism” to help tell this story now. Embracing this term, some might say, simply bolsters the traditional male-centered account of a particular approach to
law. Here, too, I suggest that as we look ahead, the practical must trump the
theoretical. While completely new names and new frames may be something that emerges in the future through feminist legal and historical work,
we are where we are now. That is, we are currently situated in a system of
knowledge and learning where the American legal realist tradition serves as
one of the most powerful accounts, if not myths, relating to the rise of the
modern legal state.295 Rather than remaining purists in our efforts to topple
this Goliath, clinging to currently divisive and binary deconstructive approaches that may be summarized as “us” versus “them,” it may better
serve our purposes to more slyly usurp the power of this parable. By actively appropriating existing terminology and infusing it with an understanding of feminist activities—much in the way that Kross did with her own
work—we may make more headway. Indeed, I would suggest that wedding
the names of two of the most referenced legal movements in the United
States—“Realism” and “Feminism”—is a powerful strategic tool that
might serve women and other marginalized groups quite well in the present
and in days to come.296
Why should we use the term “Feminist” to label this new account of
Legal Realism, Kross’s work, or anything at all? Many women’s legal historians have documented the problem of attempting to label women of history with the term “Feminist.”297 This difficulty arises in part because the
word “Feminist” has many different meanings.298 In her own day, Kross
had been labeled a feminist for her focus on women’s issues.299 And despite
the historical contestation of the term, looking at Kross and her colleagues
through our own contemporary lens, we recognize many of the same themes
and motivations expressed by the feminist legal scholars documented earlier
in this work.300
295

See supra Part I, notes 2–5.
See generally Parks, supra note 90 (recognizing that strategic allegiance with
some traditional legal realist thinking provides potential benefits for non-dominant
groups).
297
See, e.g., Mary Jane Mossman, “Le Féminism” and Professionalism in Law: Reflections on the History of Women Lawyers, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW:
GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 9, 10 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed.,
2011) (describing the “recurring historical debate about whether early women lawyers in
the United States were ‘feminists’ ”).
298
See id. at 12.
299
Howard Whitman, Annie, The Poor Man’s Judge, COLLIER’S, Mar 1, 1947, at 46;
cf. Mossman, supra note 297, at 9, 12, 24 (taking issue with law professor Barbara Babcock’s claim that nearly every early woman lawyer was a “self-conscious feminist” and
agreeing that such women lawyers “never effectively challenged the gender premises of
the law and the legal profession”).
300
See supra Part III.C; see also LERNER, supra note 117, at 15 (noting that biographers must tell stories in light of “the subject’s own consciousness and from the context
of her time”).
296
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For instance, from her days as a law student, Kross sought to challenge
the boundaries of law as commonly understood, pushing past the traditionally litigation-based, binary construction of lawyering and legal institutions.301 Lawyers were not only client representatives in individual cases,
but counselors at law who should employ a holistic vision, helping defendants re-enter society following incarceration and avoid incarceration in the
future.302 Kross did such work with a view towards improving the lives and
opportunities of women—not only those who were accused defendants, but
also the women attorneys providing such representation.303
Indeed, foreshadowing sentiments of feminist legal scholars like Patricia Cain, Kross’s early lawyering work embodied true interconnectedness.
This vision of unity in social justice efforts extended beyond the attorneyclient relationship, reaching outside of her profession, outside of her faith,
and outside of her gender. While Kross and her cohorts may have been shut
out of elite legal institutions, she did not waste her time trying to scale the
walls of the legal academy’s Ivory Tower. Nor did she spend time thinking
about how she could make it onto their lists. Rather, she figured out how to
collaborate with others in the community and in other disciplines, who could
help her make an impact on the law and lived experiences. Deeply practical
and authentically interdisciplinary, her day-to-day work spoke for itself. It
also sounded in the same practical terms as heard in the discourse of Cain
and other early feminist legal theorists.
Once appointed to the bench, Kross continued in a similar vein with her
interdisciplinary efforts to empower women so that they might have greater
agency in their own lives. Interestingly, however, perhaps more than her
lawyering activities, many of her judicial practices may be viewed in multiple lights, each potentially speaking to and against contemporary feminist
values and concerns. For instance, while some feminists today would agree
it is appropriate to seek to protect and rehabilitate young women who find
themselves working in the sex trade under harsh conditions and overbearing
bosses, others might find such judgments laden with value about sexual activity and intimacy that fail to account for the experiences and desires of all
women.304 Similarly, Kross’s efforts to hire minority women to work in the
301
Cf. Moscowitz, Opportunity, supra note 177, at 86 (noting that women—like
many men—may have the “keen knowledge of human nature, a clear insight into character, a logical and analytical mind and a sympathetic temperament” necessary for criminal
court work).
302
Quinn, Revisiting Kross’s Critique, supra note 146, at 677–78 (discussing Kross’s
participation in litigation based re-entry work).
303
See supra notes 171–176 and accompanying text (describing, in part, Kross’s focus on interconnectedness among women lawyers and between such lawyers and their
clients).
304
See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, A Defense of Prostitutes’ Self-Organization, 1 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 121, 121–24 (1993) (calling for reimagination of prostitutes as workers with rights); Beverly Balos & Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution:
Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1220, 1301 (1999) (rejecting the notion that
“prostitution is an expression of sexual autonomy”).
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Harlem Wayward Minors program might be seen as strikingly modern in
their understanding of intersectionality principles and recognizing that privileged white women may not be in the best position to speak to the needs of
poor, urban African American women.305 On the other hand, such practices
could be coded as manipulative and disrespectful—both exploiting the African American women social workers and misleading the defendants, whom
they were sent to assist.306
Much of her Home Term work, too, can be seen in these variegated
ways. Many modern feminists would shudder to think of an alleged batterer
and complainant sitting together on a couch to talk about difficulties in their
relationship with a view towards addressing the discord.307 But for others,
this is an appropriate approach to dealing with complicated human relationships, acknowledging that not all women are victims in waiting and not all
men are inchoate abusers.308 Kross’s use of volunteers and outsiders within
the workings of the courts could be lauded as a feminist challenge to legal
norms which erected walls between the law and the larger society. Yet some
feminists could see such between the cracks efforts as an abuse of power that
could mislead uneducated litigants.309 Sending privileged society women to
instruct poor families how to better live their lives could also be seen as
disempowering by today’s feminist standards.310

305
See Crenshaw, supra note 90, at 154 (“Not only are women of color overlooked,
but their exclusion is reinforced when white women speak for and as women.”); see also
Alvin Hadley, Cultural Sensitivity in African American Health Care: Strategies for Outreach to African American Communities, DIVERSITY MATTERS (2006), http://www.diver
sity-matters.net/publications-csih.pdf (“[D]escribing strategies that have been employed
by groups and institutions to reach out to families in African American communities
relating to the provision of health care.”); Ken Resnicow et al., Cultural Sensitivity in
Substance Use Prevention, 28 J. CMTY. PSYCHOL. 271, 277 (2000); Isis H. Settles, Use of
an Intersectional Framework to Understand Black Women’s Racial and Gender Identities, 54 SEX ROLES 589, 597 (2006) (studying the “value of an intersectional framework
[in] examin[ing] . . . black women’s identities and well-being”).
306
See, e.g., Cheryl D. Hicks, “In Danger of Becoming Morally Depraved”: Single
Black Women, Working-Class Black Families, and New York City’s Wayward Minor
Laws, 1917–1928, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2077, 2117–19 (2003) (describing how some
Black families came to the court system seeking assistance but ultimately had their children removed from their homes for long periods of time).
307
See, e.g., Alana Dunnigan, Comment, Restoring Power to the Powerless: The
Need to Reform California’s Mandatory Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence, 37
U.S.F. L. REV. 1031, 1052 (2003) (“[M]ediation assures that the abuser’s actions will go
unpublished and unaccounted for . . . .”); Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of Mediation
in Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235, 235 (2002) (“[M]andatory
mediation has an overall negative impact on gender relations . . . .”).
308
See Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 26–27
(2009); Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 801–20 (2007)
(challenging binary conceptions of batterers and abused).
309
See Sally Engle Merry, The Criminalization of Everyday Life, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 14 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998).
310
Cf. RUTH CROCKER, SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL ORDER: THE SETTLEMENT MOVEMENT IN TWO INDUSTRIAL CITIES, 1889–1930, at 27 (1992).
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Finally, Kross’s changing views and practices regarding legal representation present further layers of complexity for resolving her feminist identity.
Despite her early efforts to provide free representation for adult women defendants charged with sex acts in the Women’s Court, most of the young
people who passed through the Wayward Minors part went unrepresented.311
The “consent” obtained from the young women to enter into the court’s
treatment regime could be seen as problematic based on their age and other
factors.312 In addition, Kross implied that some girls received court intervention even when the evidence against them was insufficient.313 In doing so,
Kross’s failure to apply contemporary liberal legal standards relating to autonomy and individual rights could be seen as anti-feminist.314
The same informality applied in the Home Term Court, where men accused of assault and other acts of domestic violence were encouraged to
proceed without counsel. Such practices, which allow for swift incarceration of faltering batterers without resort to legal formalities or formal representation, could easily be embraced by some of today’s feminist legal camps.
Indeed, some modern domestic violence courts, driven by women’s and victims’ rights advocates, retain a similar feature in which defendants periodically report to judges for reviews without being accompanied by counsel.315
Rather than seeing these sites of complexity as problems for our characterization of Kross’s work as feminist in nature, perhaps we should embrace
311
See FISHER, JUSTICE FOR YOUTH, supra note 215, at 26 (“It is an interesting fact
that defense attorneys are nowhere to be seen during proceedings in this court. The diminishing role of the legal counselor is but another corollary of the intention of the social
court to minister to those in distress lest they fall into evils ways.”).
312
CLARKE, supra note 214, at 15. Social worker and special probation officer Dorris
Clarke, one of Kross’s protégés, claimed in her 1941 review of the Wayward Minors’
Court that, “[a]ctually, no harm was done to any of these girls and all were glad to
consent to such shelter—and as a matter of fact, many, on the adjourned date, requested
to be returned to the institution.” Id. “Regardless of the legal aspects[,]” she asserted,
the “procedure has more than justified itself socially” as the court was able in most
instances to ensure adjustment of the youth without the “stigma of adjudication.” Id. at
28. Ultimately, Clarke was able to place her writings about the Court in a legal academic
publication, in which she advocated for amending statutes to comport with many of the
informal pre-trial practices that Kross had implemented on the ground. See Dorris
Clarke, Treatment of the Delinquent Adolescent Girl: By Court or Administrative Tribunal?, 21 N.Y.U. L. Q. Rev. 225, 248 (1946).
313
Cf. KROSS, WAYWARD MINORS, supra note 213, at 2. Kross noted that “prior to
the establishment of this Wayward Minors’ Part of the Women’s Court, it was customary
for presiding Magistrates to hear charges against Wayward Minors in the Women’s Court
proper (or in Chambers), and either to dismiss charges or to adjudicate.” Id. A youth
was not supposed to be adjudicated a Wayward Minor unless “competent evidence” was
presented at a hearing and the youth was afforded “all the rights secured by law to defendants” in adult criminal courts. Wayward Minors’ Act, supra note 215.
314
It is important to note here that Kross’s work pre-dates the landmark right-tocounsel case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
315
As a New York City public defender, I appeared with clients at such domestic
violence court review dockets, where I witnessed countless other defendants appearing
without representation to answer the questions of the reviewing court. Cf. Robyn Mazur
& Liberty Aldrich, What Makes a Domestic Violence Court Work? Lessons from New
York, 42 JUDGES J. 5, 8 (2003).
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these complexities as acknowledgments of the nearly endless ways in which
any individual feminists may define themselves. For, there is no absolute
litmus test for discerning true belonging to the feminist family. Wasting
time trying to divide ourselves and precisely label is largely unhelpful, and
the application of unforgiving binaries may work to unduly exclude some
from the feminist fold. Kross shows us in concrete ways how feminism may
be seen as more than concern for “women’s issues.” Thus, as suggested by
many legal scholars and historians starting over twenty-five years ago—and
repeated more recently with renewed verve—all of us who attempt to challenge existing hierarchies to advance the liberation of all people, not just
women, may feel comfortable in seeing their work as contributing to a feminist agenda.316
Although she was largely focused on concerns of “women,” Kross did
not have a single subject of concern in mind. For instance, her approach to
domestic violence saw improvement of men’s lives as connected to the improvement of the lives of their wives and children. And looking back on her
entire career, it is hard to say whether Kross was more troubled by women’s
oppression, disenfranchisement caused by race or poverty, the marginalization caused by mental impairment, or perhaps something different altogether. Kross’s focus was not solely on women as marginalized and
oppressed persons. Perhaps this is because she wanted to help a variety of
causes and concerns.
Through activism, Kross pushed past the limitations presented by theoretical identity binaries.317 By just “doing” the work—without the privilege
or time to over-think such positions—individual constructed categories became more muted in the context of trying to achieve substantive equality.318
In these ways, Kross was arguably both an early feminist and post-femi-

316
See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality
in the Human Condition, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF
FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 161 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed., 2011) (reframing
feminism to focus not exclusively on “women’s issues” but issues of vulnerability shared
by the human race); Laura Spitz, Theorizing the More Responsive State: Transcending the
National Boundaries of Law, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: GENERATIONS
OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 305, 308–11, 314–18 (Martha Albertson Fineman ed.,
2011) (calling on feminists to play an activist role in addressing vulnerability across
national lines by engaging in the North American integrationist project); CHRISTINE
STANSELL, THE FEMINIST PROMISE: 1792 TO THE PRESENT 368–94 (2010) (describing the
emergence of Global Feminism, which made human rights issues, including health concerns and anti-poverty movements, part of the feminist agenda).
317
See LINDA NICHOLSON, IDENTITY BEFORE IDENTITY POLITICS 185–86 (Jeffrey C.
Alexander & Steven Seidman eds., 2008) (urging readers to think of “identity categories
like threads in a tapestry that is the social whole . . . [where] the meaning of any identity
category will change as it intersects with other identity category ‘threads’ ”).
318
See generally Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994)
(arguing that social constructions, such as race, “must be seen as the source and continued basis for . . . categorization”) (emphasis added).
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nist.319 With the very act of renaming Legal Realism—with an expansively
framed notion of “Feminism”—we, too can push past traditional theoretical
boundaries and destabilize the power of list-making. And, so, by telling
Kross’s story as an example of this new feminist legal realist narrative, we
begin to elide perceived limitations of labels, as well as confound differences between insiders and outsiders more generally.
Using this new history may also provide some much-needed space and
perspective for contemporary feminist work. As historian Judith Bennett
notes, “the passage of time provides . . . clearer understandings” and “the
distance of the . . . past is especially useful” for analyzing modes of thinking, allowing us to engage in less personal challenges and heated discourse
in our exchanges.320 Such new knowledge may also help blunt contemporary
claims of absolute originality, helping us to see that others before us have
grappled with many of the same issues.321 For, we may decide, with the
benefit of healthy hindsight, to reject certain of these methods that we see as
faulty in light of our contemporary commitments.322 We may also decide
that particular ways of operating provide the most promise for our future.
CONCLUSION
In these ways, Feminist Legal Realism suggests a particularly promising route for greater productivity. Seeking to actively recover feminist legal
history—which includes Kross and her cohorts as a component of our lineage—seems more useful than continuing to unsuccessfully reject completely
Legal Realism as part of Legal Feminism’s past or, alternatively, buying into
its traditional androcentric conception and Ivory Tower practices. Rather,
seeing Kross as one example of a legal feminist who engaged with lived
injustices and inequality may provide a template for ensuring our work is
more than an inchoate set of ideas.323 Thus, this new feminist legal realist

319

Cf. HALLEY, supra note 127, at 11–15.
See BENNETT, supra note 7, at 52.
321
See LERNER, supra note 117, at 183.
322
See BENNETT, supra note 7, at 46.
323
Thus, like the work of Charlotte Bunch, a women’s historian and human rights
activist, Feminist Legal Realism seeks to merge past and present, theory and practice by
(1) describing and telling stories of the past, (2) analyzing why things happened the way
they did, (3) offering a vision of what should exist, and (4) strategizing about how to
achieve that vision. See Charlotte Bunch, Not by Degrees: Feminist Theory and Education, in LEARNING OUR WAY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST EDUCATION 248, 248 (Charlotte Bunch
& Sandra Pollack eds., 1983) (“A solid feminist theory would help us understand present
events in a way that would enable us to develop the visions and plans for change that
sustain people engaged in day-to-day political activity.”). Judith Bennett embraces, advances, and expands upon this approach in her important recent work. See BENNETT,
supra note 7, at 47–49.
320
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account may respond to those frustrated with the devolution of modern feminist legal debates.324
As noted, many legal feminists have begun to urge more reality-based
and rooted responses to lived inequity. This is true among feminist historians as well.325 Interestingly, these calls are not only being made in the
course of scholarly sparring matches. Rather, many of those who began
these movements are looking back on the course of their careers—offering
their own histories—and arguing that feminism needs to rethink its current
methods and goals if it wants to progress.
Feminist historian Gerda Lerner, now in her eighties,326 has made a
forceful call for a return to action and pragmatism in a retrospective on her
career, admonishing that feminist historians should focus less on academic
issues and more on the most oppressed groups—men and women alike.327
Ann Scales, who tried to distance Feminist Jurisprudence work from Legal
Realism at the outset of her career,328 has also recently called for a return to
324
I do not mean to suggest this is the only route of transformation. Other promising
and productive feminist proposals have recently come to the fore. Kristin Kalsem and
Verna Williams, as part of the New Women’s Movement Initiative, also call for greater
pragmatism in Legal Feminism. See Kristin Kalsem & Verna Williams, Social Justice
Feminism, 18 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 131 (2010). Without considering the relationship of
Legal Feminism and the traditional realist narrative, they offer other lessons from Feminism’s first and second waves. See id. at 192 (“[d]rawing on history” to “broadly
defin[e] social justice feminism as . . . productive, constructive, and healing”). Nor do I
mean to suggest that this way of thinking should trump other emerging takes on Legal
Realism. See, e.g., Victoria Nourse & Gregory Schaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism:
Can a New World Order Prompt a New Legal Theory, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 64 (2009)
(“[N]ew realists share a vision that provides an alternative to new formalism, the theory
of neoclassical law and economics, and the variants of new formalism derived from it.”);
see also Parks, supra note 90, at 685 (calling for the creation of a Critical Race Realism
rooted in “Critical Race Theory, empirical social science, and public policy”). Indeed,
further conversation among all of these related groups—scholars and practitioners—
would likely be productive. See also Dixon, supra note 122, at 321 (suggesting mining
comparative constitutional law “to encourage greater attention to the full range of critical
feminist perspectives at a theoretical level . . . [and] encourage more careful and effective forms of practical legal interventions aimed at achieving gender justice, both now
and in the future”).
325
See e.g., BENNETT, supra note 7, at 5 (“The feminist potential of this particular
sort of women’s history—focused on feminist issues, aware of the distant past, attentive
to continuities, and alert to the workings of patriarchal power—is the subject of this
book.”). Lerner writes,
Social change is made by strategic analysis and by consistent and continuous
organizational work. An adequate strategic analysis—that is, one that can be
proven successful by pragmatic application—needs to be based on deep analysis
that takes many factors into consideration, and on an understanding of what can
be learned from historical precedent.
LERNER, supra note 117, at 1–2; see also Scott, supra note 284, at 23 (“[A]rguing that
the primary role of feminist history has not been to produce women as subjects but to
explore and contest the means and effects of that subject production as it has varied over
time and circumstance.”).
326
LERNER, supra note 117, at 19.
327
Id. at 180–87.
328
See id. at 1–2.
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some of feminism’s basics.329 Decidedly less optimistic about the movement
than she was twenty-five years ago, she seems to fear its failure if it continues down its present path, and urges renewed commitment to application of
feminist methods beyond the academy.330 Less concerned about what we
call such endeavors,331 Scales’s main goal is to push past nihilistic circularity
offered by purely deconstructive debates. Our focus, she reminds us, should
be on “collective forward motion.”332
Like Kross, we must be brave, step outside of academic debates, roll up
our sleeves, and get our hands dirty with the messy matter of presently lived
inequality. As we engage with such problems, we will not necessarily know
all of the answers in advance.333 And as each new issue of marginalization
or oppression presents itself, we may need to construct a slightly different
practical approach to addressing it. Step-by-step, we will need to feel our
way along, not always following a straight path or necessarily presenting a
coherent picture. Making our way with perpetual, if plodding, progress may
serve to reenergize contemporary feminist activities and restart stalled efforts.334 Following Kross’s method provides a way to address injustices more
directly.
Through Kross and her cohorts, we may begin to imagine a feminist
future that is less concerned about life in the academy, winning debates
about ideas, and adding our names to the list of elites. Instead, we should
begin to see our work as both more practical and more radical—in a way
that abdicates absolute definitions, seeks to bridge divides, and provides
some semblance of substantive justice for individual people in their individual lives. With Feminist Legal Realism, we may begin to embrace our yetto-be-written past and fulfill the potential of our yet-to-be-known future.

329
See ANN SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, LAWYERING AND LEGAL THEORY
3–4 (2006) (“[I]ntend[ing] to take the reader back to some feminist basics . . . to steer
away from the problems lawyers invite when we imagine that legal theory is separate
from what lawyers do.”).
330
See id. at 151.
331
Id. (“I want to enlarge feminism’s range, and I don’t even care very much what we
call it.”); see also id. at 10 (implying a connection between Feminism and Legal Realism
in stating, “The day may not be too far off when no one can remember who first said,
‘We are all feminists now.’ ”).
332
Id. at 145.
333
See LERNER, supra note 117, at 19 (“Up to now, in my life, action was usually
motivated by thought; theory led to practice. [Now] . . . the reverse is happening. I’m
living the experience and it is forcing me to reflect on it, to think about it, to meet it with
awareness.”).
334
As noted by Joan Scott, “Feminism’s history [is] so exciting . . . precisely [because of] its radical refusal to settle down, to call even a comfortable lodging a ‘home.’ ”
Scott, supra note 284, at 21.
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